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The Third Distinguished Economist Lecture was presenfed by Professor Carl Either at 
the International Maize and Wheat lmpvovement Center (CIMMYTI, in Mexico City, 
on January 15,1999, and a revised version was.published by CIMMYT. The CGIAR 
Secretariat is republishing the lecture as part of the Issues in Agriculture series and 
extends thanks to Professor Either and CIMMYT. 
Abstract: Getting African agriculture moving is the most complex and demanding 
task facing policymakers, agricultural scientists, and donors over the coming 25 years. 
This publication, based on the text of a presentation given at the CIMMYT Economics 
Program’s third Distinguished Economist lecture, examines Africa’s empty harvest in 
historical perspective and analyzes the failure of agricultural institutions imported 
from other continents (e.g., T&V extension and the land grant university model). The 
author argues that there is an urgent need for African agriculturalists to experiment 
with different agricultural institutions and to craft national “agricultural knowledge 
triangles” that include research, extension, and agricultural higher education. Africa’s 
universities are the weak link in the agricultural knowledge triangle. The lecture then 
analyzes the reasons underlying the erosion in the capacity of Africa’s faculties of 
agriculture to offer high quality graduate training in agriculture. Taking the long view 
of building sustainable agricultural institutions, the author outlines eight challenging 
puzzles that require debate and further study: creating a good institutional 
environment; crafting agricultural knowledge triangles; the case for long-term 
scientific assistance; the expanded aid agenda; changing roles of public and private 
institutions and NGOs; institution building versus marginalist approaches; strategic 
issues in improving the quality of graduate education; and “whither the CGIAR.” 
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Institutions and the African Farmer 
CARL K EICHER 
We have to work with some hope that there is a new generation, a 
group of survivors who have learned somethingfrom the disaster. 
- Chinua Achebe, 2979 
A frican hunger and famine have lost their shock value, but not their impact. People are hungry. AIDS has joined famine as a silent killer. And after 40 years of 
independence, African leaders and Africa’s institutions have failed 
their people. Donors and academics share this onus. Indeed, 
prospects appear bleak in a land of promise. 
Africa is muddling through, ill-prepared to cope with the 
awesome task of dealing simultaneously with short-term food 
emergencies and the long-term challenge of feeding an extra half 
billion people over the next 20 to 25 years. Afro-pessimism has 
spread like a plague across the continent, invading the spirit of 
Africans and undermining the resolve of academics and foreign aid 
workers. Africa’s chronic food crisis engulfs the continent like 
harmattan dust from the Sahara. To be sure, the harmattan will 
return every year, but there is no valid reason why Africa’s 
agricultural crisis cannot be solved. 
The primary cause of Africa’s underdevelopment is a seamless 
web of internal and external factors rather than a single source such 
as colonialism, geography, a lack of technology, corruption, or the 
exploitative economic policies of both the North and the South. At 
the dawn of independence in the late 1950s and early 196Os, 
industrial fundamentalism ruled the day. Agriculture was viewed as 
a backward sector with slim prospects of becoming the motor of 
development. It was assumed that industry could be developed in 
isolation from agriculture and that rapid industrialization would 
enable new nations to leapfrog over the agrarian stage and catch up 
with industrial nations by the year 2000. Industrialization, however, 
has failed to materialize and the continent is mired in an agrarian 
stage of development with two-thirds of its people deriving their 
livelihood from agriculture and the rural economy. 
Africa’s empty harvest of food crops and the loss of markets for 
some of its traditional export crops represent a tragedy in a land of 
agricultural potential and a continent of hard-working people with a 
thirst for education, healthy babies, and a better life. Many countries 
in Africa have enormous physical potential to produce food and 
traditional agricultural exports for themselves, neighboring 
countries, and international markets. But Africa’s vast agricultural 
potential is not being tapped. Tapping this potential is a major 
challenge for the African scientific community and the CGIAR 
system.* Unfortunately, the recent report by the expert panel on the 
future of the CGIAR does not shed much light on Africa’s agrarian 
crisis (CGIAR 1998). The report, prepared under the leadership of 
Maurice Strong, devotes one of its 29 recommendations to the 
African crisis. However, the Africa recommendation consists of eight 
banal “assignments” to CGIAR centers without either identifying 
which center activities should be shelved in order to finance an 
expanded program in Africa or, alternatively, citing a source of 
additional financial resources for the proposed assignments.* 
1 The CGIAR is an umbrella organization that oversees the workof the 16 international 
agrrculfural research centers. 
Africa Recommendation: “The Panel recommends a special collaborative focus on Africa that 
incorporates fhefollowing elements (11 Promote national/regional consultative processes for 
agricultuml research and development; (2) Set up an African Capacity Building Initiativefor 
Sustainable Food Security as a major inter-Center initiative; (3) Set up a fnskforce to develop a 
specialfocused program for African food security; (4) Launch a well-planned Lab to Land 
Program; (5) Develop research programs in urban and peri-urban agriculture; (6) Emphasize 
modern ecological farming methods; (7) Set priorities on staple or relevantfood crops; and 
18) Promote partnerships between strong NARSfrom various parts of the world and strategic 
Afyican NARS” (CGIAR 1998). 
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Africa is also facing human capital degradation and 
institutional decay arising from the AIDS pandemic, the decline in 
the quality of its universities, and the on-going brain drain (African 
Development Bank 1998). Currently, most of the 48 nations in sub- 
Saharan Africa do not possess the political commitment and the 
minimum threshold of scientific capacity to benefit from, and 
contribute to, the information and biotechnology revolutions that 
are now being thrust upon Africa (Maredia and Erbisch 1998). 
Although there is much palaver in donor circles about capacity 
building in Africa, many key players such as the CGIAR, NGOs, 
and US and European universities have neither the mandate or the 
resources to make an effective and sustainable contribution to 
resolving Africa’s human capital degradation. This problem needs 
to be addressed first and foremost by Africans during the next 25 to 
50 years. The degradation of human capital in agriculture has 
important implications for Africa’s future development prospects, as 
well as for donors, international organizations, and universities in 
industrial countries. 
Yet increased donor aid is not the answer to Africa’s empty 
harvest or to its .human capital degradation. Over the past decade, 
Africa has received US$64 billion of donor assistance to carry out 
policy reforms, but the results have been disappointing (Collier 
1997). A World Bank study, Assessing Aid: What Wodcs, What Doesn’t, 
and Why (1998), recently concluded that the success of policy 
reforms is crucially dependent upon “a good institutional 
environment.” Before proceeding, it is important to define 
institutions and organizations. Economic historian Douglass North, 
who has long argued that a distinction must be made between 
institutions and organizations (North 1990), defines institutions as 
the rules (the legal system, financial regulations, and property 
rights) that nurture, protect, and govern the operation of a market 
economy. By contrast, organizations refer to universities, extension 
services, and cooperatives that carry out specific missions in. society. 
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In his 1993 Nobel lecture in Stockholm, North argued that the field of 
development economics was stalled because neoclassical economists 
assumed away the importance of institutions and time (North 1998). 
He contends that the major challenge facing poor nations in Africa, 
Asia, and Eastern Europe is to develop the consistent and 
transparent institutions that are essential for the effective 
performance of organizations. The practical implication of North‘s 
argument is that organizations such as universities and extension 
systems can expand and flourish with the inflow of donor support, 
but they are likely to be unsustainable in countries that do not have 
political leaders and farm organizations working together to create 
and sustain “a good institutional environment.” 
The nagging problem, however, is that the present knowledge 
base on how to create a “good institutional environment” in African 
nations is woefully inadequate. Likewise, the knowledge base on 
how to craft effective demand-driven organizations to help poor 
African farmers, traders, and the owners of micro-enterprises is 
seriously lacking. In the balance of this paper, I shall focus on how to 
strengthen the core organizations for a modern agriculture: national 
agricultural research systems, national extension services, and 
universities. 
Since two-thirds of the people in Africa derive their livelihood 
from agriculture, it follows that effective agricultural institutions are 
a sine qua non for getting agriculture moving in Africa. But it is 
difficult to secure financial support for designing and testing new 
institutional models because of the “naive institutional optimism” 
that pervades many donor agencies. This false optimism assumes 
that African nations can import institutional models from other 
continents (e.g., Grameen Bank, Green Revolution package 
programs, the T&V extension model, and agricultural university 
models from India and the USA), thereby short-circuiting the time- 
consuming process of building indigenous institutions through a 
trial and error and learning-by-doing process. 
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Without question, the magnitude of the institution-building 
task in Africa is more daunting than it was in India in the 196Os, 
when three major international organizations helped that country 
build a system of agricultural institutions.3 By contrast, in Zambia in 
1996, there were 180 different agricultural projects being financed by 
a dozen major donors. The challenge now is to merge, reshape, and 
craft a coherent system of public and private agricultural support 
institutions in Zambia and other African nations. Building effective 
institutions is an onerous task because of the plethora of donors and 
the thousands of NGOs that are awkwardly trying to make the 
transition from their proven role in food relief to becoming effective 
agents of agricultural development (White and Either 1999). 
This lecture covers four topics: Afro-pessimism and what can 
be learned from a similar wave of pessimism that blanketed Asia in 
the 1960s; what has been learned about the causes of Africa’s empty 
harvest; capacity building in agriculture with an emphasis on the 
agricultural knowledge triangle that comprises three interlinked 
institutions (teaching, research, and extension); and, in closing, 
institutional challenges for debate and further study. Special 
attention will be devoted to the sharp decline in the quality of 
African university education, human capital degradation, and the 
“meltdown” in the capacity of African universities to offer high- 
quality graduate education. Unfortunately, this meltdown is 
occurring at the same time that donors have “pulled the plug” on 
scholarships that enable African agriculturalists to study overseas. 
Afro-Pessz*n&n.* Lesso~~om Ash arzd Latin America 
Afro-pessimism is flourishing in Africa today. It reflects the 
sense of hopelessness that Africans feel about on-going civil wars, 
corruption, urban violence, AIDS, and the limited success of foreign 
3 The Ford Foundation helped lndia strengthen its national extension service; the Rockefeller 
Foundation assisted with building research capacity and a graduate schoolfor agriculture; and 
USAID helped,finance a network of state agricultural universities (Mellou 1976; Busch 1988). 
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aid in improving the welfare of the average person. Today’s Afro- 
pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of the 1960s 
when Africa was a modest net exporter of food. At independence in 
1960, the absence of a food crisis and the fervent belief in 
industrialization help explain why many of Africa’s new leaders 
shunned agriculture and announced bold plans to catch up with 
industrial nations by the year 2000. This optimism was shared by 
many economists. In 1967, the World Bank’s chief economist 
identified seven African countries with “the potential to reach or 
surpass” a 7% annual economic growth rate (Kamarck 1967). But 
reality intervened and every one of the seven countries registered 
negative per capita growth rates over the 1970-1988 period. 
Yet Asia’s development experience reveals that a bleak 
economic future for Africa in the twenty-first century is not 
foreordained. There are scores of cracked crystal balls in economic 
forecasting. Even Nobel Laureates such as Gunnar Myrdal can 
widely miss the mark. Myrdal was pessimistic about Asia’s 
development prospects in the late 1960s because of corruption, “soft 
states,” rapid population growth, and the gloomy prospects for 
agriculture. But Myrdal failed to anticipate Asia’s Green Revolution, 
which was taking root at the same time that his book, Asian Drama, 
was rolling off the press in 1968. The rapid spread of Green 
Revolution wheat and rice varieties in Asia in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s and China achieving the fastest rate of agricultural 
growth in the world from 1980 to 1995 highlight the perils of 
economic forecasting. 
Myrdal was not the only economist who was pessimistic about 
Asia’s development prospects in the 1950s and 1960s. In World’Bank 
reports in the 195Os, both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan were 
considered to have poor development prospects. At Ghana’s 
independence in 1957, Korea, Malaysia, and Ghana had the same 
annual per capita income of around US$350. But Malaysia quickly 
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displaced Nigeria as the world’s largest palm oil exporter and, today, 
Malaysia’s R&D-driven oil palm industry is a strong competitor with 
the USA and Brazil in the world edible oil markets (Jenkins and Lai 
1992). In addition, Asian farmers today are routinely producing rice 
for African palates. Senegal, for example, is importing around 1,000 t 
of rice every day of the year, mainly from Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Pakistan. China’s agricultural sector grew at an annual rate of 5.9% 
during 1980-1990 (World Bank 1999), more than triple the 1.6% 
average agricultural growth rate in the USA and Japan over the past 
hundred years (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Although China is still a 
poor country, with an average per capita income of around US$2.50 
a day, it has increased family food security and banished famine. The 
average male life expectancy in China is now 71 years, just six years 
short of that in the USA (World Bank 1999). Finally, Bangladesh, long 
considered a “basket case,” has recently emerged as an agricultural 
success story (Ahmed, Haggblade, and Elahi, forthcoming). The 
collective lesson Africa can draw from Asia’s agricultural 
development experience is straightforward: The past is not a 
blueprint for the future! 
Latin America’s development experience also illustrates the 
role time plays and the importance of viewing development as a 
process of learning-by-doing. Most countries in Latin America have 
been independent for more than 150 years. Brazil, for example, 
became independent in 1822, some 138 years before Nigeria regained 
its freedom in 1960. During its first hundred years of independence, 
Brazil’s agricultural economy was typified by numerous coffee 
booms and busts, but today it is bubbling with agricultural 
innovations. Brazil has recently emerged as an agricultural 
powerhouse and its farmers are formidable competitors with 
American farmers in the global markets for soybean, frozen orange 
juice, and chicken. Soil scientists have solved the aluminum toxicity 
problem posed by the Cerrados soils in central Brazil, and local 
farmers are producing an average of 7.8 t/ha of grain compared with 
7.5 t/ha of maize in the US corn belt.4 Other Latin American 
countries have also emerged as aggressive competitors in global food 
markets. Chile’s booming exports of grapes, citrus, kiwi fruit, and 
wine lend additional optimism to Latin America’s agricultural 
development story. Who would have imagined back in the 1960s that 
Brazil and Chile would have acquired the technical and managerial 
capacity to go head to head with US agribusinesses in global food 
markets? To summarize, the agricultural development experience of 
Asia and Latin America counters the Afro-pessimism that 
contaminates Africa. 
Nevertheless, despite the poor track record of economic 
forecasters, doomsday scenarios for Africa continue to be cranked 
out by Western journalists. The celebrity peddler of Afro-pessimism 
is Robert Kaplan, an American geopolitical travel specialist who 
recently incorporated the findings of a two-month tour of West 
Africa into a globally-based book, The Ends of the Earth (1996). A 
reviewer concluded that “global books such as Kaplan’s are exercises 
in selling fear more than understanding” (Gourevitch 1996). 
To summarize, political and economic forecasts for developing 
countries have proven to be far off the mark. Unfortunately, many 
instant experts on Africa, such as Kaplan, are reinforcing Africa’s 
sense of failure rather than shedding light on what Africans can do to 
take charge of the development agenda and begin the ascent to a 
better tomorrow. 
Aficds Empty Harvest in Historical Perspective 
The vast, complex, and diverse continent of Africa defies easy 
generalizations. But after 40 years of independence, five basic facts 
emerge from Africa’s development experience: 
* Soil scientists discovered that the soils in central Brazil become depleted after 2-3 years of 
continuous cultivation. But with the application oflime, phosphatefertilizer, and erosion 
controls, the soils are highly productive (Sanchez et al. 1982). 
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+ Africa has an average annual per capita GNP of US$500 
(World Bank 1999). 
+ Africa’s life expectancy is low, and it is falling in some 
countries because of AIDS. Life expectancy is one decade less 
than that of South Asia and almost two decades less than that 
of China. 
+ Africa’s empty harvest has been dominated by two 
interrelated food policy problems: short-term food 
emergencies and a long-term food production gap. 
+ The volume of many of Africa’s traditional export crops has 
fallen since the early 197Os, resulting in a decline in export 
earnings, income, and employment for rural people.5 
+ Africa’s development crisis is far more than economic in 
nature. The lack of political leadership, the dearth of farm 
organizations, and the general absence of a “good 
institutional environment” explain why the crisis will not 
yield readily to economic prescriptions. 
Africa’s empty harvest in both food and traditional export 
crops should be examined together and in historical perspective. 
Agricultural exports in the continent were buoyant in the 1950s and 
196Os, but the volume of traditional agricultural exports declined 
sharply in the 1970s. Beginning in 1973, Africa became a net food 
importer. As we dig deeper, we find that virtually every African and 
Western agricultural economist was slow to recognize that Africa’s 
growing food imports in the 1970s represented the beginning of a 
chronic food gap. This oversight was clouded by Africa’s land 
abundance and a conviction that the 1968-1974 drought in the 
Sahelian region of West Africa was a transitory event, rather than the 
beginning of a decline in Africa’s long-term capacity to feed itself. 
5 By 1988, Africa’s total export earnings were less than those of Singapore, a country of 2.5 
million people (Summers 1988). If Africa had maintained ifs global share of nonpetroleum 
exports, if would have generated an additional US$ 10 billion in revenue each year during the 
197Os, an amount approaching its total annual foreign aid receipts during that period. 
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Africa’s empty harvest was unambiguously identified as a chronic 
problem in seminal reports by the FAO (1978) and the USDA (1981). 
Both reports urged African governments to pursue a disciplined 
strategy to increase food production over the long run. Nevertheless, 
most African leaders failed to act on those two reports.6 
The Honorable Tom Mboya, Kenya’s charismatic Minister of 
Economic Planning, was a lonesome advocate for boosting food 
production in the 1960s. In 1967, Mboya addressed the opening 
meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa and argued: 
Afood progiammefor Africa must be intimately related to the needs of the 
rest of the world. Our aim is not self-sufficiency; it is to become a major net 
supplier to the rest of the world. No matter how successful our efforts are to 
industrialize, it remains a fact that Afyica will be for many generations, 
primarily a producer of agricultural and other primary products. We must 
learn to do it well and on a rapidly growing scale. This will require a 
massivefvontal attack, not only on the veseavch needs to which I have 
already referred, but also on the practical problems of production, storage, 
and marketing” (Mboya 1967). 
Africa’s food crises should be viewed in historical perspective. 
The 1918 rice riots in Tokyo were caused by the same basic food 
production shortfalls that India experienced in the mid-1960s, China 
in the late 1960s and early 197Os, and Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The interesting question is: Why didn’t African leaders take steps to 
meet the crisis? There are several explanations that taken together 
may help us understand this conundrum. First, there was the fervent 
belief among African political leaders that industrialization was the 
expressway to prosperity and that food aid could help feed the cities 
and address food emergencies. Second, the Cold War induced 
dependency and rewarded predatory regimes, regardless of their 
6 See the Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It that was prepared by a team of 
American and Indian agricultural scientists under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation 
(Government of India 1959). 
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development priorities.7 Third, except in a few countries, there was 
an absence of political power of farmers, which could present a 
countervailing force to the prescribed development plans. In 
countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, however, 
large-scale commercial farmers were politically powerful and 
effective in making the case for agriculture. Fourth, the delay in 
facing up to Africa’s long-term food production crisis was linked to 
, the ready availability of food aid, a by-product of the subsidized 
agricultural policies of the North in the 1970s and 1980s. Although 
food aid can be praised for its role in addressing short-term food 
emergencies, the ready availability of “food aid subscriptions” 
delayed the day of reckoning” 
The fifth reason for the delay in implementing a long-run food 
production strategy was the shift in donor assistance strategies in 
Africa from economic growth and institution building in the 1960s to 
the premature broadening of the development agenda in the 1970s. 
World Bank President Robert McNamara led the charge to shift from 
an economic growth paradigm to a broader development paradigm 
in Africa. In his speech before the 1973 annual meeting of the World 
Bank in Nairobi, McNamara (1973) committed the institution to 
integrated rural development (IRD) to directly attack Africa’s rural 
poverty and underdevelopment. Because of the World Bank’s 
influence, most bilateral donors jumped on the bandwagon and 
marshaled technical and financial resources to help Africans prepare 
and implement IRD and area development projects. But in retrospect, 
Africa’s adoption of the second generation agenda was premature 
7 W. Arthur Lewis described the African leaders on the Cold War dole as the rogues of Africa: 
Mob&u of Zaire, Banda of Malawi, and Kaunda ofZambia. 
8 I recall a seniorforeign aid official in Nairobi in the 1970s commenting thatfood aid (for 
development) was a “plague across the continent” because it took the pressure off African 
governments to reorder development priorities in favor of agriculture. Later at a SADC 
meeting in Zambia in 1985, I recall a permanent secretary in a SADC Ministry of Agriculture 
commenting that food aid had taken the pressure off the Ministry of Finance to increase the 
budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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and the results fell as short as the “war” on rural poverty in the 
United States in the 1960s.9 
To summarize, the African response to its empty harvest in 
food and export crops has been sporadic. But development is a 
cumulative process that is built on a foundation of learning from 
false starts, poisoned gifts, pilot projects, and occasional successes 
(Hirschman 1967). Viewing development as a cumulative learning 
experience entails sifting through the evidence in the hope that a 
new generation of survivors has learned something from Africa’s 
experience. Indeed, valuable insights have been gained about the 
command system versus the market, agrarian capitalism and 
socialism, the false dichotomy between food crops and cash crops, 
the folly of developing industry in isolation from agriculture, and the 
power of special interest groups in pressuring politicians in 
industrial nations to broaden the development agenda (Stiglitz 1998). 
By looking back 40 years, we have gleaned some insights that may be 
helpful in understanding the causes of Africa’s empty harvest and 
how to get African agriculture moving again. Essential to 
understanding the situation are the intertwined phenomena of time 
optimismlO and catching-up. 
Time Optimism and Catching-Up 
Africa’s 40 years of independence have been overlaid with an 
understandable time optimism and a penchant to catching-up with 
industrial nations in a few decades. The distinguished political 
scientist Crawford Young recalls: 
g The IRD direct attack on rural povertyfailed in the Appalachian region of the USA (during 
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency), just as a similar program (community development) failed in 
some 60 countries in Lafin America and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. See Holdcroft (19841 for 
a discussion of the rise andfall of fhe community development thrust in the 1950s and 
Binszuanger (1998Jjbr a discussion of the “painfuI lessons” derivedfrom the IRD experience. 
lo The term “time optimism” conveys the practice of understating the time that it will take to 
achieve a given task such as building sustainable institutions in Africa. 
12 
It’s difficult to recapture the sense ofexkilavation that attended African 
liberation at its high water mark in 1960, when no fewer than sixteen 
states achieved independence. The crumbling of colonialism seemed but 
prologue to other triumphs (Young 2982). 
I recall the spirit of optimism in the early 1960s about 
Nigeria’s prospects for becoming an industrial powerhouse by the 
year 2000. This was a tall order, but it permeated planning circles 
and foreign aid thinking and it helps explain why many of Africa’s 
new leaders bet on industry as the vehicle to leapfrog over the 
agrarian stage of development. 
The time dimension has been a major issue in Africa’s 
development debates, especially over the issue of the short- and the 
long-run priorities for agriculture. Time was also a major issue in 
Asian policy debates in the early 1960s when influential Asian 
economists, Benjamin Higgins, and others argued that because 
agriculture was a declining industry in the long run (in terms of the 
percentage of the labor force employed and GDP), it was prudent 
to give short-run priority to industrialization. But William H. 
Nicholls (1964) argued that short-run policy attention should be 
given to agriculture to avert a subsequent food bottleneck and a 
chain reaction of higher food prices, higher wages, and reduced 
industrial profits. 
One of the most important tasks for agricultural economists is 
to convince ministries of finance to invest some of the taxes 
collected from farmers back into rural infrastructure and basic 
agricultural institutions in the short run in order to enhance the 
productivity of agriculture in the medium to long term. Few 
agricultural economists in Africa have won this argument, partially 
because of the ready availability of food aid subscriptions. Also, in 
dual agrarian societies such as South Africa, large-scale farms have 
helped ensure a reliable food surplus, thus taking the pressure off 
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the ruling party and the Ministry of Finance to address the needs of 
the country’s 10 million communal farms and the rural poor (Either 
and Rukuni 1996).r1 
The belief that a poor nation can catch up through an “industrial 
spurt” has undermined the case for a disciplined, long-term approach 
to building rural infrastructure and the scientific capacity for a 
modern agriculture. Five examples illustrate the time optimism and 
penchant for instant development: 
+ The distinguished Ghanaian economist Robert Gardiner (who 
later became the head of the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa) captured the catch-up mood of many African 
intellectuals and politicians during the 1960s when he noted 
that: “Given the variety of raw materials and their quality and 
the potential resources of energy and power with which the 
continent is endowed, there is no reason why the present level 
of development in Western Europe should not be attained by 
Africa by the beginning of the next century” (Gardiner 1968). 
+ At a political rally in Senegal in 1969, President Senghor 
launched what he called the “Mystique of the Year 2000” and 
articulated a “vision of a modern and prosperous Senegal in 
the year 2000, a Senegal that by then would have tripled its per 
capita income and entered the ranks of the world’s 
industrialized nations” (Gellar 1982). 
+ Philip Ndegwa, the late governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, 
summed up the urgency of getting on with development by 
noting that Africa is “desperately short of time” (Ndegwa 
1987). 
+ The influential 1981 World Bank report Accelerated Dezxhpment 
in Sub-Saharun Africa (the Berg report), which made the 
intellectual case for structural adjustment and policy reforms, 
I1 See Carter atid May (1999) for an anulysis of rural poverty in South Africa and the policies 
that are needed to Zz@ the constrainfs that limit the effective use of the assets (land and labor) 
of the poor. 
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concluded with this note of optimism: “policy action and 
foreign assistance that are mutually reinforcing will surely work 
together to build a continent that shows real gains in both 
development and income in the near future” (World Bank 1981). 
+ Former World, Bank Vice President for Africa Edward V. K. 
Jaycox reported that if we “focus on capacity building per se, not 
take it for granted that the capacity is there, we can make a 
tremendous difference in a very short time in Africa” 
(Jaycox 1993). 
These examples of time optimism illustrate why it is important to 
inject the time dimension into the analysis of capacity building. 
Because of time optimism it is easy to downplay the time and resources 
that will be required for building scientific and managerial capacity 
and moving low-income nations in Africa into the ranks of middle- 
income countries. Surely it is a challenge for the coming 25 to 50 years. 
After all, it took Michigan State University 70 years (1855-1925) to 
develop the capacity to produce its first PhD! 
Industrial Fundamentalism and State-Led Agriculture 
Peter Timmer (1998) and Yujiro Hayami (1998) have reminded us 
that three of the most strategic development questions for new nations 
to resolve are as follows: 
+ Should industrialization be promoted in isolation from village 
agriculture and rural industries or as a complementary activity 
that promotes agriculture-industry and rural-urban growth 
linkages? 
+ Should priority be given to investing public revenues from taxes 
on farmers back into agriculture (e.g., roads, schools, research) 
or into the industrial sector? 
+ Should agricultural production be carried out by small-scale 
private farms or by state-led production schemes such as 
government plantations, farm settlements, state farms, and 
ujamaa (communal) farming schemes? 
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Most new nations answered these questions by pursuing 
industrialization and state-led agricultural production schemes. A 
large share of the public revenue from marketing board taxes on 
farmers was invested in industrial projects (e.g., cement and textile 
plants) and large-scale agricultural schemes, many of which were 
inherited from the colonial powers. The Cameroon Development 
Corporation (CDC) is a good example and it illustrates the concept of 
path-dependence in action. l2 The CDC was created in 1946 as a 
statutory corporation to take over and administer the plantations 
confiscated from the Germans in 1939. At independence in 1960, the 
new Cameroonian government nationalized the CDC and operated 
its plantations as a parastatal (government corporation). But the CDC 
has been a money-losing white elephant. Today it has a labor force of 
13,000 and 100,000 ha of land; which includes 11 rubber plantations, 
seven oil palm plantations, three tea plantations, and two banana 
plantations, Because the CDC complex has been a drain on the 
treasury, the government put the entire complex on the international 
auction block in early 1999. 
Path-dependence also comes into play in devising schemes to 
tax farmers. At independence, many of Africa’s new governments 
continued using the colonial-style marketing boards to tax export 
crops produced by smallholders. Much of the public revenue from 
the government marketing boards was invested in state-led 
agricultural schemes that politicians sprinkled across the landscape. 
For example, soon after independence in 1961, the government of 
Sierra Leone established one state farm for each of the country’s 13 
regions as a means to what one politician described to me as 
“bringing development to the people.” Also, at independence many 
new governments maintained colonial agricultural policies that 
I2 Path-dependence is a concept used by economic historians to iZlustrate how development 
options are influenced by past events. Examples of path-dependence include the continuation of 
colonial marketiq boards, Iiberal arts style universities, and the dual agrarian structure (large- 
scale and small-scalefarms) in southern Afiica. 
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conferred tax benefits to large-scale commercial farmers in countries 
such as Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Malawi.13 
Africa’s empty harvest is partially attributed to the gamble at 
independence to give priority to building modern industrial plants 
in isolation from the concurrent modernization of village agriculture 
and village industries (Hayami 1998). Basically, the decision of 
Africa’s new nations to invest public revenues from agricultural 
taxes into state-run steel mills and plantations (instead of public 
goods such as rural roads and agricultural colleges to help small- 
scale farms) represented a pursuit of Karl Marx’s belief in 
mechanized farming and the replication of Stalin’s priority for 
industry. I4 But the decision of Africa’s new leaders to invest in 
industry in isolation from village agriculture and rural industries 
was also consonant with the views of many Western development 
economists in the 195Os, who assumed that agriculture was a passive 
sector, a black box that could be squeezed to finance industry. The 
author of a leading development economics textbook of the 195Os, 
for example, asserted that “agriculture stands convicted” for its 
inability to stimulate economic growth in other sectors of a nation’s 
economy (Hirschman 1958). Today, development textbooks 
emphasize the importance of promoting agricultural and industrial 
linkages, increasing rural non-farm incomes, and building rural and 
urban linkages in an era of globalizationi 
I3 See Deininger and Binswanger (1995) f or a detailed examination of rent-seeking and the tax 
benefits given to large-scalefarms in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Afiicn. 
I4 The industrialfundamentalism that blanketed Asia in the 1950s and Africa in the 1960s was 
partially based OM the hope of replicating Stalin’s heavy industry model, which converted the 
Soviet Union into the world’s second industrial power in two decades (1930-19501. India 
borrowed the concept ofcentral planning and industrializationfrom the Soviets in the 1950s. 
India, however, abandoned the Soviet heavy industry model in the mid-1960s and gave 
priority to addressing its food crisis. Likewise, after a decade of experimentation, China 
discarded the Soviet heavy industy model in 1970 and shifted to a balanced industry/ 
qricultmral development strategyfollowed by the abandonment of communalfarming in 1978 
and the introduction of the household responsibility system Kin 1998). 
I5 See Reardon et ai. (29981 and Hayami (1998). 
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Regrettably, the decision of many new nations to give priority 
to industry over agriculture during the past 40 years of independence 
has yielded a number of false starts in an agrarian-dominated 
continent. The experiences of Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Senegal 
illustrate the folly of giving priority to industry and state-led 
agricultural production and processing projects. Let us start with 
Ghana, the most economically advanced country in Africa (excluding 
South Africa) at independence in 1957. 
Ghana 
Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the interim government during 
Ghana’s drive for independence in the early 195Os, invited W. Arthur 
Lewis to develop a strategy to guide the government in its drive to 
become a modern industrial nation by the year 2000. Lewis, who 
later went on to win the Nobel prize in economics, surprised 
Nkrumah by stressing in his Rep& on Industrialization in the Gold 
CoasP that Ghana should give priority to increasing food 
production, not industrialization (Lewis 1953). Lewis argued that an 
industry-first strategy would be undermined by food shortages and 
rising food prices, which would raise wage rates and eventually slow 
the rate of growth of industrial production. 
Nkrumah ignored Lewis’ recommendation and Ghana gave 
priority to industrialization and harnessing the hydropower of the 
Volta River to provide cheap electric power for an aluminum bauxite 
industry. Turning to farming, Nkrumah abolished the national 
agricultural extension service that served small-scale farms because 
of his conviction that private small-scale farms were “an obstacle to 
the spread of socialist ideas” (Killick 1978). Nkrumah promoted state 
farms because of his belief in the Marxist view of the presumed 
economies of scale of large-scale plantations and mechanized 
farming (Nweke 1978). 
I6 The Gold Cost was renamed Ghana at independence. 
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But Nkrumah’s industry and state farm model of development 
failed to generate a reliable food surplus and transform Ghana into a 
modern industrial nation.17 After 10 years in office, Nkrumah was 
overthrown while on a visit to China. After Nkrumah was toppled, 
Ghana experienced a wave of coups d’etat in the 1970s and is now on 
the road to economic recovery. 
Tanzania 
Tanzania’s love affair with industrialization is equally 
instructive because after the nation gained independence in 1961, 
President Julius Nyerere made’impassioned speeches about reducing 
urban-rural income disparities by giving priority to farmers and 
rural communities. Under Nyerere’s leadership, however, the 
government abolished the Ministry of Local Government and the 
Ministry of Cooperatives and forced farmers to give up their private 
farms and move into ujamaa villages that were modeled after 
Chinese communal farms. The government used cotton and coffee 
tax revenues to help finance the establishment of some 400 state- 
owned companies, including textile and bicycle factorieP and an ill- 
fated pulp and paper factory that was built with technical expertise 
from Finland (Lipumba 1984). When the government paid small- 
scale coffee farmers 23% of the world price of coffee (Tweeten 1989), 
farmers responded to this economic extortion by smuggling coffee 
and other crops across Tanzania’s porous national borders. Although 
Nyerere is praised for his honesty, his leadership in fostering ethnic 
harmony, and his voluntary decision to step down from the 
I7 I escorted a group of Nigerian graduate students to Ghana a few weeks after Nkrumah was 
overthrown in 1967. The students were eager to inspect the achievements of thefiery Pan 
African leader. But when we arrived in the capital city of Accra, the students were stunned to 
see Ghanaians lined up at shops forfood aid handouts. The Nigerian students had a hard time 
reconciling their distant admirationfor Nkrumah with the reality that Ghana’s economy, as 
Arthur Lewis predicted back in 1953, was undermined by food shortages. 
z8 In the mid-2980s, I recall thefuneral-like atmosphere hanging over the idle, Indian-built bicycle 
facto y on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam and the state-owned shoe facto y in Morogoro that 
was running at only 4% of capacity. 
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presidency, one cannot overlook the grim reality that after receiving 
billions of dollars of foreign aid, Tanzania is the sixth poorest country 
in the world (World Bank 1999). Tanzania’s economic stagnation is a 
textbook case of the failure of state-led industrialization and 
communal farming, and it illustrates how draconian rates of taxation 
on farmers can spawn a massive smuggling operation across 
national borders. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria’s experience with industrialization represents another 
painful false start. At independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited an 
economy that was a net exporter of both food and export crops. 
Thanks to international investments in petroleum exploration that 
started in the 193Os, petroleum exports took off in the 1970s and soon 
dwarfed agricultural exports as the major source of foreign exchange 
earnings. I9 Awash with foreign exchange earnings from petroleum, 
Nigeria maintained an overvalued exchange rate that encouraged 
food imports and undermined incentives for farmers producing 
agricultural exports such as cocoa, oil palm, and groundnuts. From 
1970 to 1995, Nigeria squandered an estimated US$ 110 billion of 
petroleum revenues on a plethora of large-scale projects, including a 
US$3.5 billion state-owned iron and steel complex and numerous ill- 
fated irrigation schemes in the northern part of the country 
Undermined by political instability, corruption, and 
mismanagement, the Nigerian economy imploded in the 1980s. 
Today, Nigeria has neither modern industry or productive 
agriculture. 
lg At the beginning of the oil boom in the early 297Os, 1 recall hearing Nigekan intellectuals 
argue that Nigeria WQS poised to become an industrial giant, i.e., the Brazil of Africa, and 
that Nigeria would be exporting VWautomobiles and armaments to other African 
countries in the 1980s. 
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Senegal 
When Senegal won its independence from France in 1960, 
President Leopold Senghor announced grandiose plans for Senegal 
to become an industrial society through “state initiative and 
planning, economic specialization, and industrialization” (Vaillant 
1990). In the 196Os, the government followed the advice of French 
advisors and developed infrastructure to support new industries, 
continued the production of its main export crop (peanuts), and 
maintained close trade ties with France (Gellar 1995). In the 197Os, 
the government tried to diversify its agricultural sector away from 
peanuts and develop three engines of growth: tourism, ocean fishing, 
and phosphate exports. Abdou Diouf assumed the presidency in 
1981 and pursued Senghor’s dream of achieving an industrial take- 
off. In a radio interview in 1990, Diouf looked ahead to the year 2000 
and commented: 
I want Senegal to havefinally taken offeconomically once and for all; I 
want us to have jump-started the economy in a healthy, energetic, and 
vigorous way. Once this economic take-off has occurred, I want the country 
to reach ifs cruising altitude and cruising speed quickly, taking giant 
strides toward the status of a semi-industrial, and then industrial, society 
(Diouf 1990). 
But the pro-industry policies of Senghor and Diouf failed to 
jump-start the economy and the dreams of transforming Senegal into 
an industrial nation remain unfulfilled. 
Africans’ dreams of becoming instant industrial nations have 
been overtaken by reality. Nevertheless, despite repeated failures, the 
dreams of industrialization have great staying power. Even though 
Africa’s population was growing at double the rate of food 
production throughout the 197Os, the political arm of African 
governments, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), lobbied the 
United Nations to declare the 1980s as the Industrial Development 
Decade for Africa (Hawkins 1986). It seems fair to ask why African 
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leaders pressed on with industrialization in the 1980s at a time when 
a million people died in the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1985.20 
These four case studies illustrate the unrealized dream of 
leapfroging over the agrarian stage of development to become 
modern industrial powers in a single generation. To be sure, 
industrial output in Africa grew at an annual rate of 10% from 1955 
to 1965 (Rweyemamu 1980). However, the rate of growth slowed 
considerably in the 1970s and by 1980, because of high investment 
costs, mismanagement, and a lack of basic infrastructure, industrial 
production costs were 30-300% higher in Africa than in Asia 
(Rweyemamu 1980). 
The central insight that flows from these case studies is that 
after 40 years of independence, most African leaders are not 
assigning high priority to the first generation problem of getting 
agriculture moving (Mellor 1998a). Moreover, most policy reform 
packages are ineffective in addressing the critical issue of “political 
and institutional failure.” Although many African governments 
accepted aid-for-policy-reform packages from donors during the past 
10 to 15 years, it has been relatively easy to renege on the agreed- 
upon reforms. For example, “during a fifteen-year period, Kenya sold 
the same agricultural reform to the World Bank four times, each time 
reversing it after receipt of the aid” (Collier 1997). The political and 
geopolitical strategic location of Kenya helps explain why many 
donors tolerate this type of duplicity. 
2o The starry-eyed beliefin industrialization and mechanized statefarms as the motor of 
development was reinforced by a widespread viezo among politicians and development 
economists that small-scale familyfarms could neither be made profitable on a recurring basis 
or be counted on to generate II reliablefood surplus to provision the cities. In short, the 
industriatfundamentatism that permeated Western, Soviet, and African thinking in the 1950s 
and 1960s was based on a false dichotomy: industry versus agriculture. Both industry and 
agriculture need each otherfor raw materials, inputs, and markets. Industry must serve 
agriculture becausefarmers are a major marketfor industrial products and consumer goods in 
countries where bO-90% of the population are involved with agriculture. The crucial balance 
between industry and agriculture in any one county in Africa will depend on the nation’s 
stage of economic history, population-land rutios, and other relatedfactors. 
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But there are hopeful signs on the horizon. Mali may be 
considered a case study of a country where agriculture is moving. 
The military regime was overthrown in 1991 and President Konare 
took over and promoted democratization, a free press, and the 
growth of farmer organizationszl A recent paper, “Cotton, 
Democracy, and Development,” traces the emergence of the now- 
powerful cotton growers association back to 1974, when an extension 
agent helped local farmers organize a protest against dishonest 
cotton grading and weighing practices (Bingen 1998). Responding to 
farmers’ demands, the cotton authority “gradually transferred 
responsibility for cotton grading and weighing, equipment and 
supply orders and credit management to village groups.” Mali’s case 
study reveals how a poor nation can develop grassroots farmer 
organizations over a period of decades, provided there is 
enlightened and supportive leadership in the statehouse. Today, 
cotton and rice production and horticultural exports are flourishing 
(Tefft, Staatz, and Dione 1997). Mali’s economic success and Kenya’s 
decline in the 1990s can fundamentally be traced to who has been in 
the statehouse: Konare or Moi?22 
There are also seeds of hope in the Sahelian region of West 
Africa. One observer reports that 25 years after the devastating 
drought, “most of the countries in the region can claim to have 
decisively put the threat of famine behind them, making great strides 
in food production, transport, and marketing” (van de Walle 1998). 
But the Sahelian region remains extremely dependent on foreign aid. 
Additional seeds of hope include the introduction of improved 
cassava varieties in West Africa (Nweke, forthcoming) and the 
widespread diffusion of hybrid maize in eastern and southern Africa 
(Byerlee and Either 1997) and more recently in Ethiopia. There are 
also seeds of hope on the agricultural export front. After the 1994 
21 President Konare has a PhD in archeology. 
22 If is sfiIl too early to determine whether Mali will join Bofswunn as an Afvican success story. 
Much depends on whether the opposition party will emerge as a strongerforce and whether 
President Konare honors the constitution and steps down after two terms in office. 
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CFA franc devaluation, cotton production expanded in every 
Francophone country in West Africa except Senegal. Cotton 
production has also increased in Mozambique. Success stories in non- 
traditional export commodities include paprika from Zimbabwe, an 
array of spices from Madagascar, and cut flowers from Kenya. 
But success stories are not the product of a mere decade of toil. 
Effort must be sustained over a period of decades and this requires 
extraordinary political leadership. For example, in some countries the _ 
seeds of hope of one decade have quickly been squandered in the 
next decade. Zimbabwe is a classic case of success followed by 
failure. After independence in 1980, President Mugabe helped level 
the playing field for smallholder farmers and they responded by 
doubling maize production between 1980 and 1986 (Either and. 
Kupfuma 1998). But Mugabe lost interest in agriculture in the 1990s 
as he toyed with the land distribution question, pursued erratic 
macroeconomic policies, and most recently sent his soldiers and gem 
hunters into the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire). 
Despite Mali’s promise and the maize, cassava, and cotton 
success stories that I have cited, I am still of the conviction that most 
governments in Africa are treating long-term agricultural 
development as a secondary activity. There are only a few countries 
in Africa today where ‘there is political commitment to mount and 
sustain a disciplined long-term effort to increase broad-based 
agricultural growth. 
Getting Agriculture Moving Again 
Turning to the future, it is important that agriculture is called 
upon to do more than feed Africa’s growing population. For if we 
call on agriculture solely for increased food production, we would be 
selling agriculture short. Long-term investments must be made in the 
agricultural sector to feed a growing population, generate jobs for a 
growing rural labor force, generate foreign exchange through the sale 
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of traditional and non-traditional exports, serve as a market for 
industrial products, and contribute to rural and urban poverty 
alleviation by driving down the real (inflation-adjusted) cost of food 
over time (Johnston and Mellor 1961). These multiple challenges for 
the agricultural sector explain why agriculture is entitled to a large 
claim on public resources in order to build roads, research stations, 
colleges of agriculture, and other essential components of a modern, 
science-based agriculture. This is precisely what happened in the 
United States from 1860 to the 192Os, a 60-year span during which 
the government built roads, schools, and a free rural mail-delivery 
system, as well as colleges of agriculture and a national network of 
more than 400 agricultural research stations and sub-stations 
(Galbraith 1985). But this six-decade time frame is at sharp variance 
with the time horizons of most African leaders and foreign aid 
officials. The desire for quick fixes is epitomized by the case of an 
American ambassador in an African country who directed his foreign 
aid chief in the early 1980s to design projects that would generate 
“high visibility and quick returns.” This predilection for the quick fix 
is simply a manifestation of the current political mandate in 
industrial countries to achieve people-level impacts in Africa as soon 
as possible. 
Many African leaders are still postponing the day of reckoning, 
when it will be necessary to face up to the long-term food gap and 
the loss of export markets, and to make the hard political choices and 
investments required to develop a modern agriculture. India faced a 
similar crisis in the early 1960s and after several years of intense 
debates, the government made a fundamental political decision to 
launch an all-out campaign to become self-sufficient in food, a goal 
that it reached 16 years later in 1981. 
Much has been learned in Asia during the past 40 years about 
the catalytic roles that agriculture can play in the development 
process. A large global knowledge base is now available on what is 
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required to mobilize agriculture as a major contributor to breaking the 
cycle of poverty, hunger, and famine. 23 This information can be used, in 
turn, to mobilize the hidden creativity and unexploited potential of 
Africa’s 50 million farm families as an engine of agricultural growth. 
We now turn to the difficult task of figuring out how to develop 
effective and sustainable agricultural institutions. 
Irast;*~tionaZ~a~io~ Doumsizing andlt&mctuting 
Africa’s post-independence agrarian history has been dominated 
by two distinct phases of institutional expansion and reform. The first, 
from 1960 to 1985, can be described as a public sector expansion phase 
par excezlence-it was consonant with the state-led development 
paradigm of the day. The second, from 1985 to 1999, can be described 
as a period of downsizing public universities and research and 
extension services, privatizing parastatals, and encouraging foreign 
private investments and new forms of public/private partnerships. 
The Expansion Phase: 1960 to 1985 
At independence, virtually every new government launched 
massive public sector initiatives to mobilize, educate, and nurture the 
potential human capital that had been buried under seven colonial 
regimes. The scope of this human capital renaissance was daunting. At 
independence, Botswana had only 40 university graduates. Ln 1960,. 
90% of the agricultural researchers in Africa were expatriates.24 To 
Africanize the civil service, new governments dramatically increased 
primary and secondary school enrollment, constructed new 
universities, and sent thousands of students abroad for BSc and 
graduate level training. Donors responded admirably to the human 
capital challenge by helping to finance the construction of new 
universities, upgrading diploma level schools of agriculture into 
23 See Johnston and Mellor (1961); Schultz (1964); Either and Baker (1982); Lele (1991); Mavfin 
(1992); Idachaba (1995); EicheP and Sfaafz (1998); Ruhni (1994); Mrema (1997); Hayami 
(2997); De&ado (1998); Rusike (1998); and Reardon et al. (19981. 
24 By contrast, at India’s independence in 1947, almost all research scientists were Indian. 
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faculties of agriculture, and converting faculties of agriculture into 
agricultural universities. 
The achievements of the first generation of human capital 
development are impressive: 
+ The number of extension workers in sub-Saharan Africa 
increased from 21,000 in 1959 to 57,000 in 1980 (Judd, Boyce, 
and Evenson 1986). 
+ The number of universities increased from around 20 in 1960 
to 160 in 1996 (Beintema, Pardey, and Roseboom 1998). 
+ The number of full-time equivalent agricultural scientists 
increased from around 2,000 in I960 to 9,000 in 1991 (Pardey, 
Roseboom, and Beintema 1997). In many countries, the 
number of scientists increased five- to tenfold. In Nigeria, the 
number of agricultural scientists increased from 100 in 1960 to 
1,000 in 1985.25 
The Downsizing and Restructuring Phase 
The overexpansion of many public organizations serving 
agriculture from 1960 to 1985 was followed by a period of 
retrenchment and restructuring from 1985 to the present. Structural 
adjustment loans typically included agreed-upon conditions 
(conditionality) to reduce the size of the civil service and research 
and extension services, privatize parastatals, and promote private 
enterprise.26 The three core institutions in the agricultural knowledge 
triangle-research, extension, and higher education-have been 
downsized and restructured, and new private institutions (seed and 
25 To be sure, there is substantial variation among the 48 countries in terms of the timing, speed, 
and scope of the increase in the size of public agricultural services such as research and 
extension. Anglophone countries made the most rapid progress in replacing colonial scientists 
and civil servants. The Francophone countries lagged because many new governments invited 
the French to continue to manage their national research institutesfor 10-15 years after 
independence. Lusophone countries mere latecomers because Mozambique and Angola did not 
win their dndependence until 1975. 
26 In the early 199Os, many donors pressed African governments to go beyond these reforms and 
tackle corruption and promote decentralization, participation, and democratization. 
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fertilizer companies, universities, etc.) are now in stiff competition 
with their public counterparts. Following are highlights for the key 
players in this downsizing phase. 
Agricultural Extension 
Most public agricultural extension services in Africa are now in 
crisis because of their ineffective performance and their inability to 
underwrite the quantum growth of most national extension services. 
The T&V extension model has also come under attack because it has 
been found to be fiscally unsustainable. The crisis in extension has 
helped fuel the search for a diversity of approaches, including 
increased participation of the private sector and NGOS.~~ 
Unfortunately, there is little rigorous research on the cost- 
effectiveness of alternative extension models. 
Agricultural Research 
The rapid expansion in the number of agricultural researchers 
in the 1960s and 1970s was challenged in the 1980s because many 
public research systems were found to be unproductive and heavily 
dependent on foreign aid (Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema 1997). 
Because of these problems, many national agricultural research 
systems (NARS) are now being downsized. The Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) is overstaffed and is now being downsized 
(staff rationalization) with the assistance of a US$ 10 million grant 
from the European Union. Agricultural research is now moving in 
the same direction as extension, and a search is underway for a wide 
range of public and private models that are demand-driven and 
fiscally sustainable (Rukuni, Blackie, and Either 1998). 
Agricultural Higher Education 
Since the mid-1980s, universities have suffered a sharp cut in 
real budgets, a decline in the quality of the educational experience, 
27 For a discussion of alternative extension models for the twenty-first centu y, see Antholt 
(19981. For a discussion of the evolution of the T&Vsystem see Venkafesan and Kampen 
(1998). See Bauer, Hojimzn, and Keller (1998) for a stinging critique of the T&V model. 
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and a brain drainz8 Many faculties of agriculture that were launched 
in the 1960s and 1970s have carried out ambitious academic staff 
development programs. As a result, in many countries there are 
more Africans with PhDs in faculties of agriculture than in the public 
agricultural research institutes. This explains why several observers 
have recommended ways to increase the contribution of universities 
to the research program of NARS (Byerlee and Alex 1998). 
Four insights can be derived from this review of agricultural 
institutions that will be of help in the third phase of institutional 
change-crafting demand-driven and fiscally sustainable public and 
private institutions and NGOs. First, because of the immensity, 
diversity, and complexity of Africa, and the path-dependence that is 
embodied in its seven colonial heritages,29 it is foolhardy to assume 
that a single university or research or extension model will be 
effective throughout Africa. Peter Timmer illustrates the complexity 
of African agriculture by recalling his first visit to Kenya. 
Rice is a whole lot easier technologically. I can dviuefvom lakavta to 
Kvawang, the rice bowl of West Java. It’s 60 miles, 70 miles, out and back, 
and it’s vice fields. And it’s one variety or another, but it’s rice all the way 
out. Come back a diffeevent road and it’s vice all the way back. I haven’t been 
in Africa much, but the one time I was in Kenya, 1 vemember driving up 
one hill and down the next and seeing 12 difleeuent agroclimatic zones and 
12 diffeerent cropping pattens, and 50 difleerent crops. I couldn’t believe the 
complexity of the farming systems as they varied up and down the hills 
(Timmev 1991). 
Timmer’s observation reinforces the point that the complexity 
of African diets demands more location-specific research on 
cropping kystems than is required in the rice bowl of Asia. 
28 For a discussion ofthe decline in the quality offhe univevsify experience, see Coleman and 
Court (1993); Ajayi et al. (1996); and Willett (29981. For a discussion of building scientific 
capacity in agriculture, see McKeIvey (7965); Odhiambo (1989); Beinfemn, Pardey, and 
Roseboom (1998); Either (2990); Jones and Blackie 119921; Lele (1991); Lynam and Blackie 
(1994); and World Bank (1992). 
2g French, English, Spanish, German, Belgian, Portugese, and Italian. 
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The second insight is that most African nations are at an earlier 
stage of scientific and institutional development than India was on 
the eve of the Green Revolution in the mid-1960s. This proposition 
challenges the prevailing time optimism and reinforces the need to 
pay careful attention to the time and resources required to 
accomplish the task of strengthening the human capital base and the 
institutional foundation?O 
Third, imported institutions from other cultures and other 
continents will undoubtedly have a high failure rate in Africa if they 
are replicated before the satisfactory completion of a pilot phase. The 
T&V extension model is an example of replicating an imported 
model in several dozen African countries before it was thoroughly 
tested. But testing and modifying imported models requires public 
and foundation resources to finance pilot projects and independent 
evaluation teams that have the freedom to collect benchmark data 
and evaluate the performance of alternative organizational models.31 
The slow and patient development of the Grameen model of micro- 
credit is a good example of how action research and pilot projects 
were used to develop a new type of credit organization (the 
Grameen Bank) before it was replicated on a national scale. After 
Professor Mohamed Yunus completed his graduate study in 
economics in the United States, he joined a university in northern 
Bangladesh and set up an action research project to find out if the 
poor were bankable, i.e., would they repay small loans. He secured 
financial support from the Ford Foundation and later from IFAD to 
implement action research from 1976 to 1979 in villages surrounding 
30 See Lele and Goldsmifh fl989)f or an insightful analysis of India’s strategy of building 
scientific capacity in agriculture. 
31 If we turn back the clock to the colonial period, we note that before the large Geziru irrigation 
scheme was launched in the Sudan, researchers carried out pilot agronomic projects for 23 years 
before the water was furned on (Milligan and Hapgood 1967). Likewise, before a cotton research 
station was established in Uganda, British colonial ojh’cers spentfive years studying localfarm 
practicesfor use in designing on-station triak (Arnold 1976). By contrast, in Senegal, two 
large dams were built in the 197Os, far ahead of local agronomic research on crop rotation and 
anthropological research on how to organizefarmers, i.e., individually, collectively, etc. 
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his university, followed by a pilot phase from 1979 to 1982. In 1982, 
he decided that he had enough information to replicate his Grameen 
(village) micro-credit model throughout Bangladesh (Robinson 1998). 
Much energy has also been wasted in trying to replicate Asia’s 
Green Revolution model in Africa before the completion of pilot 
studies. Over the past decade, many instant experts on Africa have 
talked glibly about the ease of replicating Asia’s Green Revolution 
model in Africa. Many of these experts have overlooked Africa’s 
early stage of scientific development, falsely assuming that Africa 
had the requisite infrastructure,32 irrigated land, trained scientists, 
technology, and national and local institutions to replicate the 
Asian mode1.33 
Fourth, there are numerous design flaws in donor-financed, 
supply-driven models of institution building (Ruttan 1982; Either 
1982; and Tendler 1997). Notable among these flaws is the priority 
given to front-loading research, extension, and education projects 
with new buildings, vehicles, and overseas training in order to 
achieve visible progress in four to five years, the time frame that 
most donors need to justify the preparation of a second five-year 
phase. The repetition of this cycle often leads to a large staff, a 
magnificent set of buildings, limited scientific capacity, and a bloated 
and fiscally unsustainable institution. Also, the supply side approach 
that is supported by foreign aid allows local administrators (deans of 
agriculture and directors of NARSs and extension services) to 
postpone the day of reckoning, i.e., the need to focus on the demand 
side and generate political and financial support from farm 
organizations, commodity groups, and agribusiness firms. Finally, 
the supply-driven model often ignores the research needs of local 
and national groups of farmers, traders, and agribusiness and 
32 See Spencer and Badiane (1995) f or a comparative assessment of rural road density in 
Africa and Asia. 
33 See my early reservations about the Sasaknwa-Global2000 initiative to increase food 
production in Africa (Either 2988). 
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underinvests in the marketing and trade research required to ferret 
out global trade opportunities. Because of these design flaws, 
attention has now shifted to crafting demand-driven models. 
To be sure, much has been accomplished during the 
downsizing and restructuring of extension, research, and higher 
education over the past 15 years, but there is a paucity of research on 
the performance of these restructured institutions. For example, there 
are numerous studies showing that NGOs can increase grassroots 
participation in extension programs, but there is no study in Africa to 
date on the cost and benefits of achieving these higher rates of 
participation (White and Either 1999). 
We now turn to some bread-and-butter issues34 in reforming 
and strengthening the three core institutions that make up the 
agricultural knowledge triangle: 
research, extension, and agricultural 
higher education. In most countries, 
universities are the weak link in the 
triangle, partially because they are in 
their infancy. Figure 1 shows that 
most faculties of agriculture in Africa 
were established during the past 20 
to 30 years. Crafting agricultural 
knowledge triangles is complicated 
by the fact that Africa is littered with 
donor-financed development 
projects, including 2,740 in 
pre50s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 
Period 
Figure 1. Establishment dates of 
universities with a faculty of 
agriculture or veterinary sciences 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: Beintema, Pardey, and Roseboom (1998). 
34 1 am borrowing this phrasefrom Derek Byerlee’s 
infZuentia1 article “Bread and Butter Issues in 
Ecuadorian Food Policy” (19891. 
Crafiing Demand-Driven Agricultural 
Knowledge Triangles: Bread-and-Butter Issues 
Tanzania alone (Jaycox 1997)?5 Because of the well-known flaws in 
the project approach to institution building, let us turn to the 
agricultural knbwledge triangle as a way of integrating research, 
extension, and education activities and ensuring the sequential 
continuity of investments in these core institutions. 
The Agricultural Knowledge Triangle 
Over the past 10 to 15 years, there has been an on-going debate 
about the need to move beyond the project-by-project approach to a 
systems approach to coordinate and sequence interlinked 
investments in agricultural research, extension, and education.36 
Various scholars have articulated this approach under the following 
rubrics: agricultural knowledge system, agricultural knowledge 
information system (AKIS), and what I call the agricultural 
knowledge triangle. 37 Basically, these approaches argue that public 
and private managers of separately governed institutions should 
come together and “coordinate” decisions on the size and sequencing 
of complementary investments, because the payoff has been found to 
be higher if they are planned and executed as a joint activity rather 
than pursued as freestanding extension, research, or education 
projects (Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan 1979; Bonnen 1998; 
Boughton et al. 1995). 
Despite the high returns to projects that integrate research, 
extension, and education, African governments and donors, for 
many reasons, have usually prepared separate projects for each of 
35 See Morss (2984)for an early statement on the negative impact offhe proIiferation of donors 
and projects on the major institutions in Africa. 
36 See Roling (1988)fir a discussion ofthis evolution. For an update on Wageningen 
University’s adoption ofa knowledge system approach see Roseboom and Ruffen (1998). 
37 Examples include a USAID plan to strengthen agricultural research and faculties of 
agriculture (USAlD 1985); ISNAR’s report on strengthening linkages between research and 
farmers’organizafions (Eponou 2996); ISNAR’s recent study of linkages between universities 
and NARSs in Africa (Michelsen and Shapiro 1998); and the World Bark’s Agricultural 
Research and Training Project in Uganda. For a synthesis of the evolution of the World Bank’s 
supportfor agricultural services (mainly extension and research) in Africa see Venkatesan and 
Kampen 11998). 
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these activities. First, colonial export crop research stations were 
established in many countries between 1900 and 1920, followed by a 
time lag of 50 to 70 years before faculties of agriculture and 
veterinary science were established. This historical head start and 
studies showing high rates of’return to research help explain why 
agricultural research institutes have often received generous donor 
support. Second, research and extension activities are often included 
in the same project because both organizations are often 
administratively housed in the ministry of agriculture. Third, joint 
research, extension, and higher education projects are difficult to 
coordinate and implement because the administrators of universities, 
extension, and research services typically report to different 
ministries. Fourth, it is well-known that projects that integrate 
research, extension, and higher education, as typified by the US land 
grant model and the state (Indian) agricultural university model, 
have not performed well in Africa. 38 Lastly, the bureaucracies of 
donor and international organizations present their own constraints. 
An extension specialist describes the bureaucratic difficulties in 
preparing and implementing joint research, extension, and 
agricultural higher education projects in the World Bank: 
The Bank’s involvement with the development of higher agricultural 
education at the university level in Africa has been minimal. . . Within 
the Bank, the Agriculture Divisions have no responsibility for 
universities, which are the responsibility of the Education Divisions. . . . 
It is not therefore surprising that the Bank projects in extension and 
research do not provide support to higher agricultural education 
(Venkatesan 1991). 
What has been the result of sprinkling separate extension, 
research, and higher education projects across the African landscape? 
Has this approach resulted in an underinvestment in one of the three 
38 See Johnson and Okigbo (1989) for a critique of the introduction of the land grant model in 
Nigeria and Idachaba (1998) for Q discussion of the problems in implementing the state 
agricultural university model in Nigeria. 
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components of the triangle? A recent World Bank review of its 
expenditures on research, extension, and education sheds light on 
this question. The review found that agricultural higher education 
received about 2% and agricultural research and extension received 
roughly 98% of the World Bank’s US$4.8 billion of global 
Table 1. World Bank global support 
for agricultural research, extension, 
and agricultural higher education, 
1987-1997 
Mil. US$ Percent 
Agricultural research 
Agricultural extension 
Agricultural higher 
education 
Total 
$2,482 51.50 
2,229 46.25 
108 2.25 
$44.819 100.00 
Source: Will&t (1998). 
East and Central Africa 
investments in agriculture 
education, research, and 
training during 1987-1997 
(Table 1). How did Africa fare 
under this US$4.8 billion 
package? During 1987-1997, 
the World Bank made six 
loans to agricultural higher 
education totaling US$lO8 
million. Three of those loans 
were for Africa. 
The bread-and-butter issues in strengthening agricultural 
knowledge triangles in East and Central Africa are extremely 
complex because of the colonial legacy, the large number of 
agricultural institutions in the region, the institutional preferences of 
a multiplicity of donors, and the fragmentation of agriculture and 
natural resources within universities into separate faculties of 
agriculture, forestry, and environmental sciences (Mrema 1997; 
Norman 1998). Table 2 shows that there are currently 35 faculties of 
agriculture, forestry, and veterinary medicine in the ten countries in 
East and Central Africa. With 35 faculties, there is an obvious 
duplication of effort in the region, which leads us to ask, “Why can’t 
the faculties of agriculture and forestry be merged in some of these 
universities?” Because of the large number of faculties of agriculture 
and forestry in the region, most donors do not have an adequate 
information base for deciding which faculty or faculties to support 
in the region. 
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Table 2. Universities in the ten East and Central African countries 
with faculties of agricultural science 
Faculties 
Country University Agriculture Forestry Vet. Med. 
Burundi 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Rwanda 
Sudan 
Universite du Burundi 
University of Asmara 
Alemaya University of Agriculture 
Addis Ababa University 
University of Nairobi 
Egerton University 
Moi University 
Jomo Kenyatta University of S &T 
University of Eastern Africa, Baraton 
Universite d’Atananarivo 
Universite Nationale du Rwanda 
University of Khartoum 
University of Juba 
University of Gezira 
Red Sea University 
Bahr El Ghazal University 
Dongola University 
El-Gadarif University 
Upper Nile University 
Sokoine University of Agriculture 
Makerere University 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Congo 
(formerly Zaire) Universite de Kinshasa 
Universite de Lubumbashi 
Total 
Source: ASARECA Strategic Plan Report (information supplied by Directors of NARls); Mrema (1997). 
Note: Total: 35 faculties of agricultural sciences. 
Virtually all the faculties of agriculture and forestry in East and 
Central Africa are under financial stress, poorly organized, and 
losing senior staff to NGOs and the private sector. Two examples 
illustrate the problems in building high-quality graduate programs in 
agriculture in East and Central Africa. The first example 
demonstrates the problem of staffing and sustaining regional MSc 
programs; the second example pertains to offering j?hD degrees in 
the region. 
Regionalization of training is frequently mentioned as a way to 
drive down the unit cost of graduate programs. However, there is a 
large gap between the theory and practice of offering a MSc degree 
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for students from a region such as East and Central Africa. The 
experience of the University of Nairobi illustrates this point. With 
financial assistance from the government of Germany, the University 
of Nairobi launched a MSc program in agricultural economics in 
1974 for students from East Africa (Amann and Kriesell976; Thimm 
1992). The two-year program consisted of coursework during the 
first year and thesis research in the student’s home country during 
the second year. Although it.was exciting to teach courses to students 
from East Africa, academic staff members found it difficult to find 
the time and resources to travel to Uganda and Tanzania to supervise 
the research of the MSc students from these countries. Also, because 
of low salaries, funding constraints, and frequent university closures, 
the University of Nairobi’s Department of Agricultural Economics 
lost eight staff members with PhDs between 1985 and 1995 (Ackello- 
Ogutu and Mwangi 1995). Finally, because of the lack of 
scholarships, the intake of students from East Africa dried up in the 
early 1990s. The total intake of students fell to three (all Kenyan) in 
1997.3g This sobering case study of a 25-year effort to build and 
sustain a MSc degree program (1974-1999) reveals that it is easy to 
garner foreign aid to law-zck a regional MSc program but difficult to 
gain local financial support to sustain a regional MSc degree 
program, decade after decade. 
The second example of the inherent complexity of building 
high-quality graduate programs focuses on PhD level training. The 
recent experience of Makerere University in Uganda illustrates how 
difficult it is to secure funding and experienced scholars to teach up- 
to-date courses, mentor students, and supervise PhD theses. Instead 
of sending Ugandans to the United States for PhD training, Makerere 
University launched an “alternative PhD program in agricultural 
economics” in 1996. Eight American professors were recruited to 
volunteer their time and teach a one-month PhD course at Makerere 
on an accelerated basis (Wesselll998). To date, eight PhD courses 
3g The total intake of MSc students was as jolZows: 1989,ZO; 1991, 12; 1993, 5; and 1997, 3. 
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have been taught to nine Ugandan doctoral students. But World 
Bank and USAID projects offer no funds to recruit visiting professors 
to oversee the nine students during their research, analysis, and 
writing of PhD dissertations in Uganda. Again the easy task in PhD 
training programs is to teach courses. The challenge is to mobilize 
local financial support to recruit, reward, and retain a cadre of 
dedicated indigenous academic staff members who enjoy the 
challenge of recruiting, teaching, mentoring, and supervising the 
research of students. 
The Particular Case of Kenya 
After 36 years of independence, Kenya’s public agricultural 
institutions are in serious disarray. There is an on-going debate over 
the mandate, relevance, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of the 
five university faculties of agriculture, the T&V extension model, and 
the sustainability of KARL Presently, the linkages between the three 
supply-driven components-research, extension, and universities- 
are weak. Agricultural research is the strongest component in the 
triangle, but KARI is currently dependent on donor assistance for 
around 60% of its budget. KARI has just completed a major research 
priority-setting exercise and a major human capital building 
program, and it is an innovator in biotechnology. KARI’s 
Agricultural Research Fund has been effective in encouraging 
researchers from the universities and the private sector to conduct 
research consistent with KARI’s research priorities. In addition, 
KARI’s managers are aggressively trying to develop a leaner and 
more demand-driven organization. Meanwhile, Kenya’s T&V 
extension model is now being reconsidered. Major problems facing 
extension include the shortage of operating budgets and a lack of 
solid field evidence that the T&V model is effective, efficient, and 
fiscally sustainable.4O 
4o For an exchange ofviews on T&V extension in Kenya, see Bindlish and Evenson (1997); 
Picciotto and Anderson (1997); Anderson (1998); and Murethi and Anderson (1998). 
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Agricultural higher education is the weakest component in the 
triangle; furthermore, the quality of agricultural training has 
deteriorated over the past decade. From 1970 to 1985, the University 
of Nairobi was known for its high-quality undergraduate training 
and research programs and its emerging graduate programs in many 
disciplines, including agriculture. But four new public universities 
were added from 1984 to 1994, with each new university adding a 
faculty of agriculture. During this period, politics was injected into 
the academy, and in the mid-1980s, the ruling party forced all public 
universities to double their intake of students. The decision to double 
intake resulted in a sharp drop in staff morale and the quality of the 
academic experience, as well as an exodus of senior academics to 
more attractive opportunities in southern Africa, overseas 
universities, and the private sector (Oniang’o and Either 1998). 
Kenya’s experience in trying to develop a national university of 
agriculture is sobering. Egerton College was launched in 1941 by 
Lord and Lady Egerton “to train sons and daughters of farmers the 
science and practices of agriculture.“4* In 1988, Egerton College was 
upgraded to Egerton University and given a mandate to become a 
national university of agriculture. But politics intervened and 
Egerton was encouraged to admit a large number of students to its 
Faculty of Education. 42 Gradually, Egerton was transformed into a 
general purpose university; today, it is experiencing great difficulty 
in retaining its senior academic staff. Table 3 shows that Egerton’s 
Faculty of Agriculture is made up largely of junior academic staff (50 
assistant lecturers and 51 lecturers). The table also shows that out of 
135 faculty members, only six are senior academic staff; four of those 
are associate professors and two are professors for the six 
departments in the Faculty of Agriculture. The Department of 
Agricultural Economics has only one PhD in residence out of a total 
41 Geofrey Mrema, personal communication, November 21, 7 998. 
42 Many seconda y school graduates did not have the necessary grades in science to be admitted 
to thefaculties of science, agriculture, etc. 
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Table 3. Kenya: Academic staff in the Faculty of Agriculture, 
Egerton University, 1998 
Department 
Assistant Senior Associate 
Lecturer Lecturer Lecturer Professor Professor Total 
Ag Econ/Business 
Management 9 13 3 25 
Agronomy 5 11 11 1 28 
Animal Science 11 6 9 1 27 
Dairy Food 
Science/Technology 2 8 10 
Horticulture 17 6 1 2. 26 
Natural Resources 6 8 3 2 19 
Total 50 52 27 4 2 135 
Source: Ekwamu et al. (1998). 
of 25 academic staff members. The capacity of Egerton’s Faculty of 
Agriculture to offer high-quality graduate degrees in agriculture is 
problematic because of the exodus of senior academic staff, political 
meddling, and financial stress. 
Without question, the quality of graduate education in faculties 
of agriculture and forestry is crucially dependent on the presence of 
senior academic staff at the rank of associate professor and professor, 
because they must take the initiative in mentoring junior faculty 
members and setting the research direction and tone of graduate 
education. Senior academics also play a crucial role in mobilizing 
funds for graduate student research and monitoring the completion 
of degrees. 
Another sensitive question concerns the issue of size and 
critical mass. During the 1980s Kenya increased the number of 
faculties of agriculture from one to five, but the quality of the 
educational experience suffered as budgets were stretched. For 
example, in 1993/94, the University of Nairobi’s Department of 
Agricultural Economics had a budget of US$532 for supplies. With 
five university faculties of agriculture, one may legitimately ask: Has 
Kenya made the same historical (and probably irreversible) mistake 
as Belgium? Because of language differences, Belgium, a nation of 10 
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million people, has four universities with a faculty of agriculture. By 
contrast, the Netherlands, a nation of 35 million people, has one 
world-class agricultural university-Wageningen. 
These bread-and-butter examples of restructuring agricultural 
institutions in East Africa, and particularly Kenya, help explain why 
social scientists need to conduct research on the process of crafting 
demand-driven agricultural knowledge triangles (Eyzaguirre 1996). 
The task before us is to figure out how to build country-level 
agricultural knowledge triangles that are operationally linked to 
farmer organizations, the private sector, and the regional and global 
scientific communities. But in East Africa, and especially Kenya, this 
task is fraught with political obstacles because politicians are giving 
priority to the expansion of undergraduate education. Also, many 
donors have pulled back from universities and are now giving 
priority to agricultural research, extension, and NGOs. Likewise, 
with the cutback in donor funding for overseas training, donors 
have hastily and prematurely dropped the responsibility for 
graduate training into the lap of local universities. The deans of 
agriculture, forestry, and veterinary science in East and Central 
Africa are trying to develop strong linkages with ASARECA.43 
The privatization of public agricultural services accompanying 
structural adjustment programs is attracting senior academics and 
undermining the capacity of universities in East Africa to offer high 
quality local MSc and PhD degree training. Currently, there is a tug- 
of-war between private consulting firms, policy institutes, and the 
public universities for experienced agricultural scientists and 
managers. The latest attempts to strengthen one discipline at a time 
(e.g., AERC’s program to strengthen economics) in East and Central 
Africa are unlikely to be fiscally sustainable. The bottom line is that 
public universities, the rapidly expanding private consulting firms, 
43 ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and 
Central Africa). 
41 
and policy research institutes all need each other. This need 
reinforces the necessity to get on with crafting country agricultural 
research triangles that nurture these symbiotic public and 
private partnerships. 
Challenges 
The overarching development challenge facing African 
agricultural scientists and policymakers today is how to help Africa’s 
48 independent nations rediscover their agrarian heritage, bury Afro- 
Pessimism, take charge of the foreign aid agenda, and mount a 
disciplined, long-term effort to develop a modern agriculture. But 
African leaders are feeling frustrated by the reluctance of donors to 
take a long-term approach to capacity and institution building. For 
example, in 1995, the World Bank appointed a group of eminent 
Africans to form a working party and report to the World Bank on 
the progress being made by the multi-donor African Capacity 
Building Initiative (ACBI). The working party, chaired by the 
distinguished Kenyan economist Harris Mule, presented its report to 
the World Bank in October 1996. The following passage was among 
the report’s highlights: 
The World Bank is a major player in Africa’s development and its 
interventions have major impacts on the pace and pattern of Africa’s 
development in general, and capacity building in particular. It is not easy 
for outsiders to gauge howfar the Bank has been successful in promoting 
capacity building in Afiica. Many of the recent Bank statements on 
capacity building are, however, impeccable, and have played an important 
role in placing capacity building issues on the Afvican policy agenda.... 
Yet these initiatives, important though they are, are mere additions to the 
Bank’s main mission, which is lending. There is no evidence that they are 
pursued with the same enthusiasm and vigor as,for example, policy-based 
lending. This is in spite ofthefact thaf without capacity, the impact of the 
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Bank’s operations, whether on project or policy-based lending, will have 
below optimal results (Mule 1996). 
Despite these frustrations, it seems fair to pose the question: 
Why should donors invest in long-term capacity building in Africa 
when African political leaders engage in cross border wars; purchase 
fancy jets, build unneeded international airports, and readily tolerate 
corruption? Even if donors agree to help support capacity-building 
programs, there is an absence of intellectual agreement on how to 
build agricultural knowledge triangles for 48 countries with seven 
colonial histories. 
In light of these frustrations and powerful crosscurrents, what 
can African agriculturalists do to mobilize African and donor 
support to plan and implement a disciplined, balanced, accretionay 
long-term program to build a system of institutional pillars for a 
modern agriculture? I emphasize balanced and accretiona y because 
_ many donors have offered generous short-term support for one or 
two of the pillars (e.g., extension or research). The World Bank, for 
example, has been generous in supporting research and extension 
projects, but it allocated only 2% of its global US$4.8 billion research, 
education, and extension expenditures to agricultural higher 
education over the 1987-1997 period. I have already underscored the. 
futility of seeking a recipe for building institutions in the large, 
complex, and diverse continent of Africa. Rather, attention should be 
directed to eight challenges that require further study and debate. 
The first two challenges call for Africans to step forward and provide 
some long overdue political and scientific leadership. 
Challenges Ahead 
1. Creating a “good institutional environment” 
In this lecture, I focused attention on building the three cost- 
effective public organizations-research, extension, and training- 
that form the agricultural knowledge triangle, because these 
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organizations are essential for a modern agriculture. Although public 
organizations are necessary, they are not, in and of themselves, a 
sufficient condition for agricultural development. To be effective, 
public organizations must be nurtured, protected, financed, and 
rewarded by a “good institutional environment.” Such an 
environment includes a transparent legal system, protection of 
property rights, stable macroeconomic conditions, and political 
participation of farmers and commodity groups. In addition, once a 
good institutional environment is established, it requires unusual 
political skill to maintain it over time.44 
African leaders must take responsibility for building a good 
institutional (political) environment for development. After a good 
institutional environment is in place, the next step is for the 
agricultural leadership-both public and private-to encourage 
political leaders to concentrate on the first generation problem of 
accelerating the’rate of agricultural growth. The next step is to craft 
demand-driven agricultural knowledge triangles that are 
operationally linked to and supported by farm organizations, the 
private sector, and the global scientific community. 
2. Crafting agricultural knowledge triangles 
I have stressed the basic point that research, extension, and 
agricultural higher education are complementary activities and that 
the collective return on investments in these activities will be higher 
if they are interlinked rather than pursued separately. But designing 
a triangle that achieves sequential continuity in these three 
investments requires a rare skill that is not covered in the basic 
textbooks on project appraisal. Crafting is a process-an intensely 
political process. The University of Nairobi’s 25-year attempt to 
develop a sustainable, regional master’s degree program in 
agricultural economics is a classic example of an organizational 
44 The current di$ficuIties that universities, extension, and vesenrch organizationsface in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria illustrate what happens when political leaders allow II good 
institutional environment to deteriorate. 
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experiment that was financed by the North but never supported by 
the national or regional governments, in this instance, Kenya’s 
political leadership and its Ministry of Finance. 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of vision in Africa, in donor 
communities, and in academia on how to craft demand-driven 
agricultural knowledge triangles and how to achieve sequential 
continuity of the core investments. In light of this vacuum, I 
recommend that a one-year moratorium be imposed on all proposed 
donor-financed research, extension, and higher education projects in 
Africa. Those 12 months should be used to buy time to allow African 
agriculturalists and donor representatives to come together and 
figure out (1) how to develop demand-driven agricultural research 
triangles; (2) how the leaders of separately governed organizations 
(research, extension, and faculties of agriculture) can communicate 
and cooperate; (3) how the triangles can be linked to and supported 
by the local and national political processes; and (4) what donors can 
do to assist in the crafting process. 
3. The casefov long-term scientific assistance 
Starting in the mid-1980s, many development specialists 
pointed out the shortcomings of long-term technical assistance and 
recommended its rapid phase out together with a build-up of 
African consulting firms and the transfer of training from overseas to 
African universities.45 But this blanket approach to the localization of 
human capital improvement has some flaws. There is growing 
evidence that overseas training in agriculture is being prematurely 
phased down, before African universities have had the time to 
mobilize resources and a national political commitment to build and 
sustain high-quality local MSc degree programs. I recommend a 
gradual phase down of overseas training at the MSc level over the 
coming decade, coupled with an intense dialogue with ministries of 
finance on financing local MSc training programs. 
45 Ah see Berg (1993) and Jnycox (1993,1997). 
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Turning to technical assistance, a new type of long-term 
technical assistance-scientific technical assistance-should be 
introduced to help shore up graduate training programs and 
develop African research capacity in such areas as intellectual 
property rights, biodiversity, agribusiness, and information systems. 
Surely a cadre of 500 scientists from industrial nations, spread over 
48 countries during the coming 25 to 50 years, would have a high 
payoff. The scientists should be posted in universities, national 
agricultural research institutes (NARIs), and ministries of science 
and technology. 
The issue of long-term scientific technical assistance in 
agriculture is closely related to the new initiative to build advanced 
scientific institutes in Latin America, which has been under 
discussion for more than a year, thanks to the leadership of 
President Eduardo Frei of Chile. Several Latin American 
governments, private foundations, and the World Bank are 
preparing a plan to develop a global chain of so-called Millennium 
Institutes that will serve as scientific centers in developing countries 
(Macilwain 1998). Initial plans call for the establishment of centers 
in middle-income countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Colombia. If the concept proves successful, it will be promoted in 
Asia and Africa. Hopefully, the architects of the Millennium 
Institutes for Africa will study the history of similar projects in 
Africa over the past 40 years (Either 1989; Court 1991; Coleman and 
Court 1993; and Ajayi et al. 1996). 
4. Expanded aid agenda 
In the early 196Os, three major donor organizations, USAID, 
the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, worked 
together closely to help India build an effective system of 
institutional pillars (research, extension, and education) for a 
modern agriculture (Lele and Goldsmith 1989). The government of 
India proved to be a superb innovator as it set up a number of new 
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institutions such as the state agricultural university system (Busch 
19881, the Agricultural Prices Commission, and Fair Price Shops. But 
donor coordination has proven to be much more difficult in Africa 
than it was in India because of the large number of donors in Africa, 
changing donor fashions, and the broadening of the development 
agenda to the point where agriculture has been marginalized in 
many donor agencies. USAID’s experience dramatically illustrates 
how agriculture has been marginalized over the past decade. In 1985, 
USAID allocated the largest share of its Africa budget to agriculture 
(47%) and it provided scholarships to 250 Africans for overseas 
training in agriculture (USAID 1985). In 1998, USAID allocated only 
10% of its Africa budget to agriculture (USAID 1998) and provided 
scholarships to around 20 African students for overseas long-term 
training in agriculture (Atwood 1998). 
What is driving this shift in donor priorities away from human 
capital improvement and old-fashioned agricultural development 
and economic growth? Two icons in development economics, John 
Mellor and Anne Krueger, have addressed this question. Mellor 
recently commented on why it is so difficult to get donors to focus on 
agricultural growth in Africa: 
Foreign aid is now captive to a myriad of special groups. Today they include 
child survival, vitamin A, microcredit, poverty, microenterprise (excluding 
agriculture), empowerment of women, environment, wildlife preservation, 
and on and on. Extrapolation of the history of speciaI interests in foreign 
aid suggests that tomorrow the list will be different and longer. Priorities 
and strategy cannot coexist with such a panoply of special interests, each 
with its own objectives (Mellor 199821). 
Stanford economist and former World Bank Vice President 
Anne Krueger argues that the World Bank has made a mistake in 
taking on “soft issues” such as environmental matters, cooperation 
with NGOs, and combating corruption. She contends that “a strong 
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case can be made that the Bank has moved far beyond its essential 
competence in addressing these issues, and in so doing, has 
overstretched the capacity of its staff” (Krueger 1998). But in light of 
recent events in Indonesia and Zimbabwe, one can challenge 
Krueger on her description of corruption as a “soft issue.” Without 
question, corruption is a core issue in Africa and one must applaud 
the World Bank for trying to address it. Nevertheless, one can agree 
with Krueger’s general concern over the World Bank’s broadened 
agenda. World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz recently laid out a 
“new paradigm for development” that includes participation, 
decentralization, and community development (Stiglitz 1998). 
Hopefully, World Bank staff will study the failure of the community 
development movement of the 1950s and Robert McNamara’s ill- 
timed and poorly executed IRD thrust of the 1970s. 
To summarize, the broadened development agenda of donors 
makes it difficult for African governments to garner donor support 
for a long-term attack on Africa’s human capital degradation and its 
ineffective agricultural institutions. 
5. Changing roles of public and private institutions and NGOs 
What are the most productive roles for public, private, and 
NGO institutions in supporting African farmers, traders, and 
agribusiness firms? There are many ideological positions on this 
issue, but there is little hard evidence on the performance of various 
types of public, private, and NGO organizations over time. However, 
we can glean some insights from Zimbabwe’s experience in laying 
the foundation for increasing maize production: 
+ The government-not Oxfam-developed Zimbabwe’s 
impressive all-weather road network. 
+ The government-not private seed companies-conducted 
research for 28 years (1932-1960) that led to the development 
of the SR-52 hybrid that increased maize yields by 40%. 
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+ Commercial farmers-not external pressure-developed a 
politically powerful farm organization that made the case in 
the Parliament for public investments in research and farmer 
support organizations (Either 1995). 
Zimbabwe’s experience highlights the strategic importance of 
an active government role in the early stage of development, because 
private traders are unlikely to deliver research, extension, and credit 
services to smallholders, especially those in remote areas (Blackie 
1990). The state was the organizer and risk-taker in developing 
Zimbabwe’s all-weather road network, agricultural research system, 
and its extension service. Zimbabwe’s private sector has slowly 
taken on a greater role in maize breeding, seed distribution, and the 
marketing of new high-value export crops. Avoiding dogmatism is 
critical when considering what should be done by the state or the 
private sector and when examining the sequencing and changing 
roles of the public and private sectors and NGOs over time 
(Bonnen 1998; Echeverria 1998). 
6. Institution building vs. mavginalist approaches 
Over the past 40 years, the pendulum for building Africa’s 
human capital and scientific capacity has shifted from building new 
institutions (i.e., the supply side approach) to a more delimited or 
marginalist approach. Most of the current capacity-building 
programs can be classified as marginalist. Donors have made this 
shift because of on-going civil wars, the failure of large-scale 
institution-building projects, and a growing awareness of the length 
of time involved in institution building. Currently, short-term 
capacity-building initiatives are in vogue in donor circles. These 
include support for commodity research networks (Robinson 1998) 
and strengthening a single discipline, such as economics under the 
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) (Fine 1997). 
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On the issue of time, two scholars studying the experience of 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s University Development Program 
(UDP), which assisted 15 universities in 12 countries for 20 years 
(1963 to 1983), concluded that “a high concentration of resources 
over a short period of time can result in a ‘too much, too soon’ 
syndrome” (Coleman and Court 1993). If the Rockefeller Foundation 
discovered that 20 years was too short of a time to build strong and 
effective universities, what does one infer from this experience for 
the architects of the marginalist approaches that are now in vogue? 
The lesson that I draw is that time and sustainability should be kept 
in mind as donors finance an increasing number of commodity 
networks and draw up lo-year plans to develop “sustainable” PhD 
programs in Africa. 
African and Western scholars should challenge the misleading 
time optimism that is now conventional wisdom in development 
circles. Without question there is a need to mount a major effort to 
strengthen the agriculture knowledge triangle over the next 25 
to 50 years. 
7. Graduate education: strategic issues 
Undergraduate education is the bread-and-butter of African 
university education, and the political pressure to increase 
undergraduate enrollment is relentless. Nevertheless, the urgency to 
set up African-based graduate programs is dramatized by two 
sobering facts. First, as few as 20 Africans a year currently receive 
doctorates in economics from all sources, both within the continent 
(including South Africa) and outside of it (Fine 1997). Second, Ghana 
has been independent for 42 years and “no Ghanian university has 
ever produced a PhD in Economics” (Jebuni 1998). When the AERC 
was launched in 1988, it carried out a study of graduate education in 
economics in Africa and found that “graduate training in any 
meaningful sense appeared to have collapsed in most universities.” 
The study attributed this to the following systemic causes: “lack of 
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funds, civil disorder, loss of good staff, deteriorating faculties and 
equipment, and a massive expansion of undergraduate enrollment” 
(Fine 1997). Many donors and foundations have responded to these 
issues by “pulling the plug” on overseas training (prematurely in my 
judgement), thus accelerating the devolution of graduate training in 
Africa. However, the Africanization of graduate education is 
occurring precisely when the quality of undergraduate education in 
Africa is declining because of the rapid proliferation of faculties of 
agriculture, forestry, and MSc programs, and a “meltdown” in the 
capacity in some fields (especially agricultural economics and 
economics) to offer high-quality MSc degree programs. A number of 
sub-regional (e.g., southern Africa) MSc degree programs are now 
being introduced throughout Africa, but the experience of the 
University of Nairobi’s MSc program in agricultural economics for 
East Africa illustrates the difficulty of securing local financial 
support to sustain these programs over the long term. 
In summary, African universities are being summoned to take 
on the second generation challenge-expanding graduate 
education-at a time when politicians are promoting a relentless 
expansion of undergraduate enrollment. Foreign aid-financed 
overseas training is being prematurely phased out. Without question, 
overseas PhD training in many fields of agriculture will be needed 
for many decades. The complex issues involved in building graduate 
education capacity in Africa require further study and debate. 
8. Whither the CGIAR? 
What is the role of the CGIAR in capacity building in Africa? 
What has transpired since my critique of the CGIAR in the early 
1990s (Either 1992,1994)? In 1992, I argued that the CGIAR 
management had taken a wrong turn in the road when they 
increased the number of CGIAR centers from 13 to 1846 and that the 
CGIAR was overburdened with secondary tasks at the expense of 
46 Today, the CGIAR cotnprisesl6 caters. 
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that which was essential. Looking back, it is clear that the addition of 
five new centers was driven by valid substantive concerns to expand 
research on natural resources and the environment, and the desire of 
some bilateral donors to find a permanent home (in the CGIAR) for 
some of the non-affiliated centers that they had been supporting. The 
financial stress following the expansion is partially a result of the 
failure of donors to provide a commensurate increase in the budget 
to support the expanded mandate and the addition of five new 
centers. To address the noticeable loss of momentum of the CGIAR 
system in the 198Os, I declared that there was 
an urgent needfor the Chairman oftke CGIAR system to appoint a kigk- 
level Commission offouv eminent scientists and four CGIAR members to 
study alternative management structuresfor the 21St Century. The 
Commission should befinanced by a foundation(s) and given 24 months 
to prepare a White Paper with a recommended management structure. A 
new management model should be in place by Centers Week of 1994 
(Eicker 1992). 
Six years later, the Strong Report was presented at the 1998 Annual 
Meeting of the Centers. The Strong Report falls far short of resolving 
the tough problems facing the CGIAR and posed by the Africa 
question, which is the Achilles’ heel of the system. It remains to be 
seen whether follow-up studies will satisfactorily resolve the 
unfinished work of the expert panel. 
Since the CGIAR centers are spending 40-44% of their 
collective budget on Africa, it is important to examine the CGIAR’s 
record of capacity-building there. One can applaud WARDA’s 
initiative in setting up the rice research network and IFPRI’s decision 
in 1992 to help strengthen the Bunda Faculty of Agriculture in 
Malawi, as well as IFPRI’s recent move to establish similar programs 
in Ghana and Mozambique. But one wonders whether IFPRI can 
mobilize the required funds and stay the course for the 10-20 years 
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that are required for building MSc capability in faculties of 
agriculture that are in their infancy. Indeed, after seven years of 
assistance to the MSc program in agricultural economics in Malawi, 
IFPRI has withdrawn its support (except for short-term consultants) 
and shifted its attention to strengthening the Faculty of Agronomy 
in Mozambique. In retrospect, it may have been prudent for IFPRI 
to have helped the University of Zimbabwe strengthen its regional 
MSc program in agricultural economics and urged Malawians to 
pursue their MSc degrees in Zimbabwe. 
The WARDA and IFPRI examples illustrate how difficult it is 
for CGIAR centers to mobilize adequate resources for long-term 
capacity-building programs in Africa. The budgets available to 
CGIAR centers are extremely modest relative to those of 
agricultural experiment stations in the United States. For example, 
in 1997, the budget of the Michigan State University Agricultural 
Experiment Station (AES) was US$65.6 million. The AES has 141 
tenure-stream (permanent) faculty members serving a clientele of 
51,000 Michigan farms, comprising 8,000 full-time commercial 
farms, 16,000 part-time farms, and 27,000 “hobby farms.“47 When I 
juxtapose CIMMYT’s 1997 budget of US$30.6 million, alongside its 
global mandate for maize and wheat, and its economics, natural 
resources, and biotechnology programs, I am forced to conclude 
that CIMMYT should move cautiously before embarking on new 
programs to combat human capital degradation in Africa. Instead 
of each CGIAR center trying to resolve this dilemma, the entire 
CGIAR system should address the following question: What can 
the CGIAR collectively do to help accelerate the development of 
Africa’s scientific capacity in food, agriculture, and natural 
resources? 
47 Commercialfarms have annual sales of over US$ 200,000 per year; pa&timefarms have sales 
of US$ ZO,OOO-99,000 per yeq and hobby farms have sales of less than US$ lCJ,OOO per yea% 
53 
References 
Ackello-Ogutu, C., and W. Mwangi 1995. Training of Agricultural Economists in Eastern 
and Southern Africa. In G.H. Peters and D.D. Hedley (eds.), Agricultural 
Competitiveness: Market Forces and Policy Choice; Proceedings of the Twenty-Second 
International Conference of Agricultural Economists, Harare, Zimbabwe, 22-29 
August 1994. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth. Pp. 591604. 
African Development Bank 1998. African Development Report 2998. New York: Oxford. 
Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade, and T.U. Towfiq (eds.). Forthcoming. Out ofthe Shadow of 
Famine: The Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ajayi, J.F. Ade, Lameck K.H. Goma, G. Ampah Johnson, with a contribution by W. 
Mwotia. 1996. The African Experience With Higher Education. Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press. 
Amann, V.F., and H. Kriesel. 1976. Post Graduate Training in Agricultural Economics, 
Economics and Commerce in Eastern Africa Universities. In L.I? Schertz, A.R. 
Stevenson, and A.M. Weisblat (eds.), International Training in Agricultural 
Economic Development. New York: Agricultural Development Council, Inc. Pp. 
83-88. 
Anderson, J.R. 1998. Agricultural Extension in the World Bank’s Technology 
Enhancement Program for Rural Development: Controversies on Methods, and 
Needs for Better Linkages to Research. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. Paper presented October 1. 
Antholt, C.M. 1998. Agricultural Extension in the Twenty-first Century. In C.K. Either 
and J.M. Staatz, (eds.), International Agricultural Development. Third edition. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 354-369. 
Arnold, M.H. (ed.). 1976. AgriculturaI Researchfor Development: The Namulonge 
Contribution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bauer, E., V. Hoffman, and l? Keller. 1998. Agricultural Extension Down the Ages. 
Agriculture and Rural Development January, 1998:%6. 
Beintema, N.M., PG. Pardey, and J. Roseboom. 1998. Educating Agricultural Researchers: 
A Reviez offhe Role ofAfrican Universities. EPTD Discussion Paper No. 36. 
Washington, D.C.: IFPRI and ISNAR. 
Berg, E.J. 1993. Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reformsfor Capacity Building in Africa. 
New York: UNDP 
Bind&h, V., and R.E. Evenson. 1997. The Impact of T&V Extension in Africa: The 
Experience of Kenya and Burkina Faso. The World Bank Research Observer 12 
(2):182-201. 
Bingen, R.J. 1998. Cotton, Democracy and Development in Mali. Journal ofModern 
African Studies 36(2):265285. 
Binswanger, HP. 1998. Agricultural and Rural Development: Painful Lessons. In C.K. 
Either and J.M. Staatz (eds.), International Agricultural Development. Third edition. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 287-299. 
Blackie, M.J. 1990. Maize, Food Self-sufficiency and Policy in East and Southern Africa. 
Food Policy 15:383-394. 
Bonnen, J.T. 1998. Agricultural Development: Transforming Human Capital, Technology 
and Institutions. In C.K. Either and J.M. Staatz (eds.), Infernational Agricultural 
Development. Third Edition. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. Pp. 271-286. 
Boughton, D., E. Crawford, J. Howard, J. Oehmke, J. Shaffer, and J. Staatz. 1995. A 
Strategic Approach to Agricultural Research Program PIarming in Sub-Saharan Afyica. 
MSU International Development Working Paper No. 49. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan State University. 
54 
Busch, L., 1988. Universitiesfor Da7eZopmenf: Report offhe Joint Indo-US Impact Evaluation 
of the Indian Agricultural Universities. AID Project Impact Evaluation No. 68. 
Washington, D.C.: USAID. 
Bye&e, D. 1989. Bread and Butter Issues in Ecuadorian Food Policy: AComparative 
Advantage Approach. World Development 17(10):1585-1596. 
Byerlee, D., and C.K. Either (eds.). 1997. Africa’s Emerging Maize Revolution. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Byerlee, D., and G.E. Alex. 1998. Strengthening Nafiona[ Agricultural Research Systems: 
Policy Issues and Good Practice. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Carter, M.R., and J. May. 1998. Poverty, Livelihood and Class in Rural South Africa. 
World Development 27(1):1-20. 
CGIAR. 1998. The International Research Partnership for Food Security and Sustainable 
Agriculture. Third System Review of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research, October 8,199s. Washington, DC.: CGIAR Secretariat. 
Coleman, J.S., and D. Court. 1993. University Development in the Third World: The 
Rockefeller Foundation Experience. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Collier, I? 1997. The Failure of Conditionality. In C. Gwin and J.M. Nelson (eds.), 
Perspectives on Aid and Development. Policy Essay No. 22. Washington, D.C.: 
Overseas Development Council. Pp. 51-77. 
Court, D. 1991. The Development of University Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. In l?G. 
Altbach (ed.), International Higher Education: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc. Pp. 329-347. 
Delgado, C. 1998. Africa’s Changing Agricultural Development Strategies: Past and 
Present Paradigms As a Guide to the Future. The Brown journal of World Affairs 
5(1):175-214. 
Diouf, A. 1990. A Conversation with President Abdou Diouf. CSIS Africa Notes. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown 
University. 
Echeverria, R.G. 1998. Will Competitive Funding improve the Performance of Agricultural 
Research? Discussion Paper No. 98-16. The Hague: ISNAR. 
Either, C.K. 1982. Reflections on the Design and Implementation of the Senegal 
Agricultural Research Project. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. Paper 
Either, C.K. 1988. An Economic Perspective on the Sasakawa-Global 2000 Initiative to 
Increase Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper presented at the 
workshop Reviewing the African Agricultural Projects. The Sasakawa-Global 
2000 Africa Initiative, Nairobi, 18 March. Atlanta, Georgia: The Carter Center. 
Either, C.K. 1989. Sustainable Institutions for African Agricultural Development. Working 
Paper No. 19. The Hague: ISNAR. 
Either, C.K. 1990. Building African Scientific Capacity for Agricultural Development. 
AgricuIturat Economics 4(2):117-143. 
Either, C.K. 1992. Revitalizing fhe CGIAR System and NARSs in the Third World. Staff 
Paper No. 92-73. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Michigan State University. 
Either, C.K. 1994. Building Productive National and International Agricultural Research 
Systems. In V.W. Ruttan (ed.), Agriculture, Environment, and Health: Sustainable 
Development in the Xst Century. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota 
Press. Pp. 77-103. 
Either, C.K. 1995. Zimbabwe’s Maize-Based Green Revolution: Preconditions for 
Replication. World Development 23(5):805-818. 
Either, C.K., and D.C. Baker. 1982. Research on Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Critical Survey. MSU International Development Paper No. 1. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State 
University 
55 
Either, C.K., and M. Rukuni. 1996. Reflections on Agrarian Reform and Capacity Building in 
South Africa. Staff Paper No. 96-3. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. 
Either, C.K., and J.M. Staatz (eds.). 1998. International Agricultural Development, Third 
Edition. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ekwamu, A., G. Kanyama-I’hiri, N. Karanja, S. Mpepereki, and D. Norman. 1998. 
Evaluation ofthe Forum Programme Supported by the Rockc$elIer Foundation. Nairobi: 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
Eponou, T. 1996. Partners in Technology Generation and Transfer: Linkages Between Research 
and Farmers’ Organizations in Three Selected AfYican Countries. Research Report No. 
9. The Hague: ISNAR. 
Evenson, R.E., p Waggoner, and VW. Ruttan. 1979. Economic Benefits from Research: 
An Example from Agriculture. Science 205:1101-1107. 
Eyzaguirre, l? 1996. Agricultural and Environmental Research in SmaZZ Countries: Innovative 
Approaches to Strategic Planning. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
FAO. 1978. Regional Food Plan for Africa. Report of the Tenth FAO Regional Conference 
for Africa, September 18-29,197s. Rome: FAO. 
Fine, J.C. 1997. Networks for Research and Learning: A Strategic Approach to Capacity 
Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper presented at the Meeting on Human 
Capital: African Higher Education. Bellagio, Italy, July lP17,1997. 
Galbraith, J.K. 1985. Ideology and Agriculture. Harpers Magazine, February 15-16. 
Gardiner, R. 1968. Foreword. In A.F. Ewing (ed.), Industry in Africa. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gellar, S. 1995. Senegal: An African Nafim2 Between Islam and the West. Second Edition. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Gourevitch, l? 1996. Misfortune Tellers: In A New Trend, Hell Is Other Peoples. The New 
Yorker, April 8, p. 100. 
Hawkins, A.M. 1986. Can Africa Industrialize? In R.J. Berg and J. S. Whitaker (eds.), 
Strategiesfor Afvicun Development. Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press. Pp. 279-307. 
Hayami, Y. 1997. Development Economics: From the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Hayami, Y. 1998. Toward a New Model of Rural-Urban Linkages under Globalization. 
(Background paper for World Development 2000.) Tokyo, Aoyama-Gakuin 
University. Second Draft. December. 
Hayami, Y., and V. Ruttan 1985. Agricultural Development: An International Perspective. 
Revised Edition. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hirschman, A. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press. 
Holdcroft, L. 1984. The Rise and Fall of Community Development, 1950-65: A Critical 
Assessment. In C.K. Either and J.M. Staatz (eds.), AgriculturaZ Developmenf irz The 
Third World. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 46-58. 
Idachaba, ES. 1995. Human Capital and African Agricultural Development. In G.H. 
Peters and D.D. Hedley (eds.), Agricultural Competitiveness: Market Forces and 
Policy Choice: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Conference of 
Agricultural Economists, Harare, Zimbabwe, 22-29 August 1994. Aldershot UK: 
Dartmouth. Pp. 540-553. 
Idachaba, F. 1998. Personal Correspondence. April 14. 
India, Government of. 1959. Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It. New Delhi: 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development and 
Cooperation. 
Jaycox, E.V.K. 1993. Capacity Building: The Missing Link in African Development. The 
Courier (Brussels)141:73-75. 
56 
Jaycox, E. 1997. Get Back to the Basics Says Edward Jaycox. Feeding the Future. 
Newsletter of the Sasakawa Africa Association. Issue 10. 
Jebuni, C.D. 1998. The Study ofDoctoruI Education in Economics: Ghana Case Study. Nairobi: 
African Economics Research Consortium. 
Jenkins, G.P., and A.K.K. Lai. 1992. Malaysia. In A. Krueger, M. Schiff, and A. Valdes 
(eds.), The Political Economy of Agricuhd Pricing Policy. Vol. 2. Asia. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Johnson, G.L., and B.N. Okigbo. 1989. Institution-Building Lessons from USAID’s 
Agricultural Faculty Development Projects in Nigeria. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 71(5):1X-1218. 
Johnston, B.F., and J. Mellor 1961. The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development. 
The American Economic Review 51(4):566-593. 
Jones, R.B., and M.J. Blackie. 1991. An Approach to the Development of Expanded 
Postgraduate Training for Agricultural Scientists within the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference Region. Agricultural Systems 35:251-264. 
Judd, M.A., J.K. Boyce, and R.E. Evenson. 1986. Investing in Agricultural Supply: The 
Determinants of Agricultural Research and Extension Investment. Economic 
Development and CufturaI Change 35(1):77-113. 
Kamarck, A. 1967. The Economics of African Developmenf. New York: Praeger. 
Kaplan, R. 1996. The Ends of the Earth: A Journey At The Dawn of The 21st Century. New 
York: Random House. 
Killick, T. 1978. Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana. 
London: Heinemann. 
Krueger, A. 1998. Whither the World Bank and the IMF? Journal of Economic Literature 
86:1983-2020. 
Lele, U. (ed.). 1991. Aid to Afvican Agriculture: Lessons From Two Decades of Donors’ 
Experience. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lele, U., and A.A. Goldsmith. 1989. The Development of National Agricultural Research 
Capacity: India’s Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance 
for Africa. Economic Development and C&tlral Change 37~305-343. 
Lewis, W.A. 1953. Report on Industrializafion and the Gold Coast. Accra, Gold Coast 
(Ghana): Gold Coast Government Printing Office. 
Lin, J.Y. 1998. Agricultural Development and Reform in China. In C.K. Either and J.M. 
Staatz (eds.), International Agriculfural Development. Third edition. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 523538. 
Lipumba, N.H. 1984. The Economic Crisis in Tanzania. In N. Lipumba, L.A. 
Msambichaka, and S. Wangwe (eds.), Economic Stabilization PoZicies in Tanzania. 
Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam. Pp. 1946. 
Lynam, J.K., and M.J. Blackie 1994. Building Effective Agricultural Research Capacity: 
The African Challenge. In J.R. Anderson (ed.), Agricultural Technology: Policy 
Issues for the International Community. Wallingford, UK: CAB International. Pp. 
106-134. 
Maciliwan, C. 1998. World Bank Backs Third World Centres of Excellence Plan. Nature 
396:711. 
Maredia, K.M., and F.H. Erbisch. 1998. Capacity Building in Intellectual Property 
Management in Agricultural Biotechnology. In F.H. Erbisch and K.M. Maredia 
(eds.), Intellectual Property Rights in Agricultural Biotechnology. New York: CAB 
International. Pp. 49-61. 
Martin, L.R. (ed.). 1992. A Survey of Agricultural Economics Literature. Vo1.4, of Agriculture 
in Economic Development, 1940s to 199Os, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Mboya, T. 1967. A Dezelopmcnt Strategy for Africa: Problems and Proposals. Nairobi: 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. 
57 
McKelvey, J. 1965. Agricultural Research. In R.A. Lystad (ed.), The African World: A 
Survey of Social Research. New York: I’raeger. Pp. 317-351. 
McNamara, R.S. 1973. Address to The Board of Governors. Nairobi, Kenya, September 
24,1973. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Mellor, J. 1976. The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing 
World. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Mellor, J.W. 1998a. Foreign Aid and Agriculture-led Development. In C.K. Either and 
J.M. Staatz (eds.), Internatiomd Agricultural Deve2opmenf. Third edition. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 55-66. 
Mellor, J.W. 1998b. Closing the Last Chapter on U.S. Foreign Aid: What To Do About 
Africa? Choices Fourth Quarter: 3842. 
Michelsen, H., and D. Shapiro (eds.). 1998. Strengthening the Role of Universities in the 
National Agricultural Research Systems in Sub-Saharan Ajrica. Cotonou, Benin, 17- 
21 November 1997. Highlights of a Workshop. The Hague: ISNAR. 
Milligan, M., and D. Hapgood. 1967. No Easy Harvest: The Dilemma ofAgricuZture in 
Underdeveloped Countries. Boston: Little and Brown. 
Morss, E. 1984. Institutional Destruction Resulting from Donor and Project Proliferation 
in Sub-Saharan African Countries. World Development 12(4):465-470. 
Mrema, G.C. 1997. Agricultural Research Systems in the ECA Sub-Region. In G.C. 
Mrema (ed.), Development ofa Long Term Strategic Planfor Agricultural Research in 
the Eastern and Central Afvican Region. Kampala, Uganda: ASARECA. 
Mrema, G.C. 1998. Personal Communication, November 21. 
Mule, H. (Chairman). 1996. Parfnershipfor Capacity Building in Africa: A Report of the 
Working Parfy on The Impact of Bank Policies, Instruments and OperntionaI Practices 
on Capacity Building in Afiicu. Washington, DC.: World Bank. October report. 
Muriethi, J., and J.R. Anderson. 1998. Farmer-Extension-Research Interfaces. Paper 
presented at the conference Transforming the Agricultural Research System in 
Kenya: Lessons for Africa. Bellagio Study and Conference Center, Bellagio, Italy, 
October 19-23,1998. Draft. 
Myrdal, G. 1968. Asian Drama: An Enquiry Into The Poverty of Nations. 3 Vols. New York: 
Pantheon. 
Ndegwa, I? 1987. Commentaries on Political Considerations, Nationalism, and 
Development. In J.W.Mellor, C. Delgado, and M. Blackie (eds.), Accelerating Food 
Production in Sub-Saharun Africa. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. Pp. 309318. 
Nicholls, W.H. 1964. The Place of Agriculture in Economic Development. In C.K. Either 
and L. Witt (eds.), Agriculture in Economic Development. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Pp. 1144. 
Norman, D.W. 1998. Institutional Capacity With Reference to Applied Microeconomics in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. Nairobi: Rockefeller Foundation. 
North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
North, D.C. 1998. Economic Performance Through Time. In C.K. Either and J.M. Staatz 
(eds.), International Agricultural Development. Third edition. Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 78-89. 
Nweke, F.I. 1978. Direct Governmental Production in Ghana. Food Policy 
August:202-208. 
Nweke, F.I. Forthcoming. Africa’s Cassava Transformation. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University Draft. 
Odhiambo, T.R. 1967. East Africa: Science for Development. Science 158:876-881. 
Oniang’o, R., and C.K. Either. 1998. Universities and Agricultural Development in 
Kenya: An Agenda for Renewal. Paper presented at the conference Transforming 
the Agricultural Research System in Kenya: Lessons for Africa. Bellagio Study 
and Conference Center, Bellagio, Italy, October 19-23,1998. Draft. 
58 
Pardey, P.G., J. Roseboom, and N.M. Beintema. 1997. Investments in African 
Agricultural Research. World Devefopment 25(3):409423. 
Picciotto, R., and J.R. Anderson. 1997. Reconsidering Agricultural Extension. The World 
Bank Research Observer 12(2):249-259. 
Reardon, T., K. Stamoulis, A. Balisacan, ME. Cruz, J. Berdegue, and B. Banks. 1998. 
Rural Nonfarm Income in Developing Countries, Importance and Policy 
Implications,” In The State ofFood and Ag~iczdtuve 1998. Rome: FAO. 
Robinson, E. 1998. Networks in Africa: The Agricultural Science Division’s Exploration into 
Micuoeconomics. New York: Rockefeller Foundation. Draft. 
Robinson, M.S. 1998. Microfinance: Sustainable Financial Intermediation. In C.K. Either 
and J.M. Staatz (eds.), International Agricultural Development. Third edition. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 390415. 
Roling, N. 1988. Extension Science: Information Systems in Agricultural Development. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Roseboom, J., and H. Rutten 1998. The Transformation of the Dutch Agricultural 
Research System: An Unfinished Agenda. World Development 26(6):11X&1126. 
Rukuni, M. (Chairman). 1994. Report of the Commission ofInquiry info Appropriate 
Agricldltural Land Tmldre Systems. Vol. 1. Main Report; Vol. 2. Technical Reports; 
Vol. 3. Methods, Procedures, Itinerary and Appendices. Harare, Zimbabwe: 
Commission of Inquiry. 
Rukuni, M., M.J. Blackie, and C.K. Either. 1998. Crafting Smallholder-Driven 
Agricultural Research Systems in Southern Africa. World Dezxlopmenf 26(6):1073- 
1087. 
Rusike, J. 1998. Zimbabwe. In M.L. Morris (ed.), Maize Seed Industries in Devefoping 
Countries. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Pp. 303-320. 
Ruttan, V.W. 1982. Agricultural Reseurch PO&Y. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Rweyemamu, J.F. 1980. Introduction. In J.F. Rweyemamu (ed.), Industrialization and 
Income Distributiolz in Africa. Dakar, Senegal: Codesria. 
Sanchez, P.A., C.A. Palm, J.H. Villachier, and J.J. Nicholaides. 1982. Amazon Basin Soils: 
Management for Continuous Crop Production. Science 216:821-27. 
Schultz, T.W. 1964. Transforming Trudifional Agriculture. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press. 
Schultz, T.W. 1981. Investing in People: The Economics ofPopulation Quality. Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E. 1998. Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and 
Processes. 1998 Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD. Geneva, October 19,1998. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Spencer, D.S.C., and 0. Badiane. 1995. Agriculture and Economic Recovery in African 
Countries. In G.H. Peters and D.D. Hedley (eds.), Agricu2tura2 Competitiveness: 
Market Forces and Policy Choices. Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International 
Conference of Agricultural Economists. Held in Harare, Zimbabwe, August 22- 
29,1994. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth. Pp. 61-78. 
Summers, L.H. 1992. The Challenge of Development: Some Lessons of History for Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Finance and Development March: &9. 
Tefft, J., J. Staatz, and J. Dionk. 1997. Impact ofthe CFA Devaluation on Sustainable Growth 
far Poverty Alleviation: Preliminary Results. Bamako, Mali: Institut du Sahel. 
September. 
Tendler, J. 1997. Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Thimm, H.U. 1992. Professional Manpower for Agricultural Development in SADCC 
Countries. Agricultural Economics and Rural Development 2(1):37-44. 
59 
Timmer, C. I! 1991. Comment on ‘Can Africa Be Transformed Rapidly and If So, How?’ 
In Winrock (ed.), African Development: Lessonsfro~ Asid..Proceedings of a Seminar 
on Strategies for the Future of Africa. Sponsored by the Africa Bureau, US 
Agency for International Development and Winrock International, Baltimore, 
Maryland, June 5-7,1991. 
Timmer, C.P. 1998. The Agricultural Transformation. In C.K. Either and J.M. Staatz 
(eds.), international Agricultural Development. Third edition. Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 113-135. 
Tweeten, L. 1989. The Economic Degradation Process. Americnn Journal t$Agricultuva~ 
Economics 71(5):1102-1111. 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 1985. Planfor Supporting 
Agricultural Research and Faculties of Agriczdture in Africa. Washington, D.C.: 
USAID 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 1998. Reporf to Congress 
on Title XII: Famine Prevention and Freedomfrom Hunger. Washington, DC.: 
USAID. 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1981. Food Problems and Prospects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Decade of the 1980s. Washington, D.C.: USDA. 
Vaillant, J.G. 1990. Black, French and African: A Ljfe ofL&pold St!dar Senghor. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
van de Walle, N. 1998. ‘Moins d’Etat, Mieux d’Etat’? The Politics of State Retrenchment 
in West Africa. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Political Science, 
Michigan State University. Draft. 
Venkatesan, V. 1991. World Bank’s Agricultural Services Initiative in Africa: Main Issues 
and Future Strategy. JournaZ of Extension Systems December:28-43. 
Venkatesan, V., and J. Kampen. 1998. Evolution ofAgricultuva2 Services in Sub-S&ran 
Africa: Trends and Prospects. Discussion Paper No. 390. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Wessell, K.L. 1998. End of Term Report (1995-1997). Agricultural Research and Training 
Project. Kampala, Uganda, and Columbus, Ohio: Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Makerere University and Ohio State University 
White, R., and C.K. Either. 1999. NGOs and the African Farmer. Staff Paper No. 99-01. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State 
University (Available on the WWW at: http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/msu.html) 
Willett, A. 1998. Agricultural Education Review: Support for Agricultural Education in the 
Bank and By Other Donors. Executive Summary. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 1992. World Bank Assistance to AgricuIturaZ Higher Education, 1964-2990. 
Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank. 
World Bank. 1998. Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why. Washington, D.C.: 
Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. 1999. World Development Report 1998/99. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Young, C. 1982. Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class and Ethnic@. Daedulus 
Spring:71-98. 
60 
CarlK. Either i ’ 
.I Carl K. Either is University Distinguished Professor (Agricultural 
Economics and African Studies) at Michigan State University. He received ’ 
his B.Sc. in 1952 and his MSc. degree in 1966 from Michigan State University. 
In 1961, he received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University and joined 
Michigan State’s Department of Agricultural Economics. Over the past 38. 
years, Prof. Either has specialized in African development problems. His 
career has been devoted to training students, building African universities, .- 
and helping develop applied research capacity in a dozen countries across the 
continent. He served as Visiting Professor at the University of Nigeria (1963- 
. 66). Stanford University (1968), and the University of Zimbabwe (1983-87). 
He was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Science Degree by the University 
of Zimbabwe in 1998 for his contribution to improving the quality of life of the 
people in Africa. \ 
Either’s article,“Facihg Up to Africa’s Food Crisis,” in Foreign Affairs 
(1981) called attention to Africa’s chronic food problem and the need to move 
beyond shortterm integrated rural development projects and structural 
adjustment program. For the past two decades, Either has urged African 
policymakers and donors to focus on the fundamentals of agricultural 
development: strengthening institutions and macroeconomic capacity; 
improving human capital; and developing an indigenous capacity to develop, 
borrow, and diffuse new technology appropriate to the circumstances of 
small-scale family farms. 
/ Two of Either’s books have served as standard development 
textbooks: Agriculture in Economic Deve/opment(with L. Witt) 1964; and 
/nternationa/Agricu/fura/ Development, Third Edition (with J. Staatz) 1998. 
His other books include Research on Agricultural Development in Sub-. 
Saharan Africa: A Critical Survey(with Doyle Baker) 1982; ZimbabweS 
Agricultural Revolution (with Mandivamba Rukuni) 1994; and Africa’s 
Emerging Maize Revolution (with Derek Byerlee)1997. ., \ 
Printed on recycled paper 
i 
Tlw C ‘GI.JR Swwtrrriot 
The World Bnnk 
IR18HStreet. NW 
U’nshington, DC 20433, USA 
T&k (Z-202) 473-89.51 Fux: (l-202) 473-8110 
E-nmil: cgin~$@iarory or cgiar(icruorldbank. org 
WC-b&e: http://wuJu/. cgiaxorg 
